

ION
ED
er Al-
Adven-
Viking
Barris
ry. By
C. M.
xford
al De
Hull
acq
John-
cents
Aug-
n, Jr.
and
tions.
ng in
oomis
Rine-
Mc-
Com-
ton.
story
n R.
eten-
Perry
any,
lbert
By
J. F.
De-
ideas,
the
uted
Lay-
ugh-
orge
art.
arb.
ive-
gan,
ley.
By
Ox-

THE HOLWOOD EDITION

THE *Nation* September 18, 1943

**Italy and the Future
The Appeal to the People**

AN EDITORIAL

★

Washington Fog

BY I. F. STONE

★

Russia and Labor Unity

BY HAROLD J. LASKI

★

Pushing the Japanese Back

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

CENTS A COPY • EVERY WEEK SINCE 1865 • 5 DOLLARS A YEAR



This one's going to hurt!

Invasion comes high—in blood and money.

Part of the cost must be paid with human life. That means deep and lasting hurt for many and many an American family.

Part of the cost must be paid in cash . . . this September. And *that's* going to hurt, too!

The 3^d War Loan Drive is here!

To pay for invasion—to get the money to keep our fighting machine going—you, and every man or woman in America, are asked to invest in at least one extra \$100 Bond in September.

\$100 EXTRA, mind you—for *everybody*!

No man or woman can hold back. No man or woman can point to his Payroll buying and say, "They don't mean me!" No man or woman can say, "I'm already lending 10% or 12% or 20%—I'm doing enough!"

Sure—it's going to hurt. It's going to take more than spare cash this time—more than just money that might have gone for fun. It's going to take money you have tucked away. It's going to take part of the money we've been living on—money that might have meant extra shoes or clothes or food! Money that might have gone for *anything* that we can get along without!

Sure—it'll be tough to dig up that extra money. But we've got to do it—and *we will*.

We'll do it partly because of the look that would come over the faces of our fighting men if we should fail. We'll do it partly because the cheapest, easiest way out of this whole rotten business is for everybody to chip in all he can and help end it quick. We'll do it partly because there's no finer, *safer* investment in the world today than a U. S. War Bond.

But mostly, we'll do it because America is right smack in the middle of the biggest, deadliest, dirtiest war in history.

And we're Americans.

Back the attack with War Bonds

This space contributed to the Third War Loan Campaign by

THE PUBLISHER OF THE NATION

A M E

VOLUME

THE
back
well have
when Mu
Africa h
United N
should b
the Wehr

And s
Duce's re
long give
against u
by surren
Africa de
confronte
war again
of the arm
fare be co
that conse
and 9 and
the Italian
ity. That
about the
proceed.

That th
temporari
at last cor
their joint
a fundam
to be penn
their full
consequen
necessarily
Never hav
accept the
given so cl
offered an
are as not
Italy.

There n
policy has
surrender.

THE *Nation*

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 157

NEW YORK · SATURDAY · SEPTEMBER 18, 1943

NUMBER 12

The Appeal to the Italian People

THE hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its own people," President Roosevelt might well have said on that fateful summer day of 1940. For when Mussolini made of Italy a German stepping-stone to Africa he charted at least one invasion route for the United Nations. He thereby decreed that the Italian land should become a battleground for two mighty forces, the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies.

And still another consequence derived from the Duce's reckless crime. The Italian people, who had for long given proof that they did not wish to make war against us, have never had the chance of winning peace by surrender. Ever since the German failure to hold North Africa delivered Sicily into our hands, they have been confronted with the inescapable duty of joining us in the war against Hitler's Reich. And even though the terms of the armistice do not specifically demand that this warfare be continued after the completion of our occupation, that consequence is implied both by the text of Articles 2 and 9 and by the logic of the situation in which we and the Italians find ourselves. Italy cannot return to neutrality. That is the cardinal fact from which all thought about the future of the Mediterranean war front must proceed.

That the Italian population as a whole must, at least temporarily, take part in this revolutionary struggle was at last conceded by the President and Mr. Churchill in their joint appeal of September 10. That message signaled a fundamental and inescapable truth which will prove to be permanent. If we seize upon it, if we develop to their fullest the rich implications of the situation, the consequences which our impending military gains must necessarily have in the Balkans will be greatly multiplied. Never have we been given such an opportunity, and, to accept the logic of history gladly, never have we been given so clear a duty. The responsibilities which we were offered and which we shirked in the case of France are as nothing compared to those that challenge us in Italy.

There must be no pretense that our established foreign policy has played any part in bringing about the Italian surrender. Not the silent wizardry which certain con-

servative writers claim to be the special skill of our State Department but far more stringent arguments have overthrown Mussolini and humbled Badoglio. Three main causes stand up with Himalayan clarity above the confused geography of minor events. The causes of the Italian collapse were: first, the German military crisis, induced by the colossal failures on the Russian front; second, the progressive conversion of the Italian people's refusal to fight into a revolutionary will to be out of it; and third, the imminence of our invasion. No characteristic part of our foreign policy was even designed to effect the conjunction or intensify the action of these causes. Indeed, the State Department has consistently disclaimed having a hand in major developments of this war, preferring to assign responsibility to the military. Its present dependence on the will of the Italian people should suffice to establish the necessity of intelligent political warfare.

But it may not suffice. Our leaders may still fail to realize that the peoples of Europe can have no enthusiasm for a Metternichian peace and no profound loyalties to governments designed to be consonant with such a peace. The present regime, referred to as a government in the terms of the armistice, has already given proof that it cannot be regarded as a satisfactory leadership. It has vainly attempted to deny the unmistakable imperative of the Italian people's will. It has shown itself to be in every way as repressive in intention as the old Fascist regime. Its repression, indeed, was at first confessedly directed toward keeping Italy in the war on the Axis side.

We are making minimum charges that do not depend upon any theory concerning Badoglio's ultimate political motives but merely recite the salient facts. That he resisted the forces that are working in conjunction with our military effort should be sufficient. Nor should it incline us toward clement judgment that when he had already realized that our invasion and his collapse were inevitable, his dictatorship sought to maintain the old anti-democratic structure until the Germans should take over. That is to say, he did absolutely nothing to encourage the Italian people, whether in the army or out of it, to implement those terms of the armistice which call

for military action. Only in Milan and other northern cities where the liberal movement has come to life was there serious resistance to the Germans. It is clear that Badoglio was, in reality, a nonentity having no force to oppose us and very little will to aid us.

But Badoglio did more than resist the popular imperative. Since Italian troops had demonstrated in Sicily that the palace revolution inspired them no more than naked fascism had done, Badoglio's bargaining power with us derived principally from the German army's presence. There is too much evidence that between July 25 and the second week in August, when the first peace overtures were made, he invited Hitler to send strong reinforcements to his aid. That part of Hitler's speech of September 10 which asserted the contrary referred to Badoglio's refusal to proceed with the inacceptably few divisions the Führer had originally agreed to dispatch. The essence of Badoglio's entreaty, according to a report that appears to have its source in the London Foreign Office, can be summed up in these words: "Either send at least 35 divisions, together with enough airplanes to defend all Italy, or permit me to bargain for neutrality." Whether or not at heart Badoglio would have preferred to remain loyal to the Axis, the fact is that his policy enabled Hitler to organize and strengthen his defenses. The price that must be paid in life and destruction will be far higher than the emerging democracy of Italy would have made it.

If Mussolini long ago charted the line of our military advance, the Italian people have surely indicated what political route we should follow. The London report already referred to states that the three powers concerned have made no binding contract to maintain Badoglio in power. It hints also that London is not unalterably opposed to acknowledging the existence of the opposition parties in Italy. It would have been better had the implied offer of partnership been made with the unmistakable timbre of a choir of orchestral brass. Italian democracy would have been far more encouraged had there been no vague suggestion that it was regretfully regarded as a last-minute alternative to military dictatorship.

It is still not too late to initiate a sound policy. One touch of living democracy is a powerful restorative that quickly banishes the effects of past sickness. Clause 10 of the armistice actually facilitates the restriction of purely military government by the Allies to regions judged by General Eisenhower to be of paramount operational importance. We shall not attempt to guess what this suggestive clause will be held to mean by our diplomats. Article 12 also states that other conditions of a political nature must eventually be accepted by the Italian government. We are thus at liberty to collaborate with a genuine Italian democracy or with those forces which will seek to recreate it. Will our fears and our past errors once again hold us back?

The Shape of Things

WHILE ASKING FOR A SECOND FRONT THAT would bring about the withdrawal of 60 German divisions from the eastern front, the Russians have been engaged in pushing westward the entire German army of some 200 divisions at about as rapid a rate as could possibly have been achieved by any Anglo-American action. Having completely smashed the German lines in the Donbas and in the sector halfway between Kursk and Kiev, the Red Army has moved forward with unprecedented speed. Advances as great as twenty miles in a single day have been reported. From an economic point of view the freeing of the Donets Basin with its rich coal deposits is far more significant than the more spectacular gains of last winter. Coal trains already are reported to be arriving in fuel-starved Moscow, thus making certain that that city will not have to pass another winter in cold and darkness. The only flaw in the prospect is the likelihood that the Soviet offensive may soon be stopped, not by the Nazis, but by the heavy autumn rains which are reported to have already begun in some sections of the Ukraine. This would, of course, give the Germans time to reform their lines and might hold off the recapture of Kiev and the Crimea until winter.

★

IN THEIR RELIEF OVER RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE negotiating which preceded Italy's surrender, many Americans failed to note that France, the country most directly concerned in many of the arrangements, was ignored altogether. The French Committee of National Liberation has issued a strong statement pointing out that it had earlier informed the Allied governments of "terms which it regards as indispensable to safeguard the vital interests of . . . France," and that these conditions have been disregarded. This new snub to the National Liberation Committee appears to be a direct result of the equivocal recognition accorded it by the United States and Great Britain, under which it is not considered the government of France in the same sense, even, that the refugee governments are presumed to represent their countries. This policy is particularly difficult to justify in view of the progress made within the committee itself in the past fortnight in bringing it in line with patriotic French sentiment. François de Menthon, a leader of one of the largest of the French underground organizations, has been added to the committee and named to the key post of Commissioner for Justice. Moreover, the commission that is to supervise the purge of former Vichyites from the armed services includes three representatives of the underground among its five members. Plans have also been drawn up for a new consultative assembly to meet in Algiers on November 3. The various political

parties a
proporti
in Fran
ernment
tion as
commit
governm

A MO
Republic
inac Isla
It had to
editorial
marked
with thi
of age,
and to h
the wor
adopted
the coun
moment
The dele
United S
sovereign
event of
national
tion of I
Force in
posals ma
vail by v
spiritual
sovereign
the coun
some sov
relax in
most con
joining o
row. "E
Peterkin
famous v

BY CON
Mackinac
to seem
ministrati
organizat
force to k
in more
entitled t
of going
favor of
initial im
of past p
which ar
the Medi

parties are to be represented in the assembly in the same proportion as in the last Chamber of Deputies elected in France. Thus, while the American and British governments still treat the Committee of National Liberation as if it were a stepchild of the United Nations, the committee itself is rapidly taking on the stature of a real government.

★

A MOMENTOUS STEP WAS TAKEN BY THE Republican Party's Post-War Advisory Council at Mackinac Island last week, and we wish we knew what it was. It had to do with foreign policy, and we have the solemn editorial assurance of the most influential papers that it marked a turning-point in the history of the party, which with this remarkable achievement is said to have come of age, to have awakened to its national responsibility, and to have pointed the way to a bright future for all the world. After seven readings of the unanimously adopted report the only achievement we can detect is the council's astonishing success in equivocating at a moment when decisiveness at last seemed inescapable. The delegates voted for "responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations." But they hastily added that in the event of a conflict between national interests and international obligations, we must adhere to our own Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights. Force in international affairs was condemned and a proposal made for the "attainment of a peace that will prevail by virtue of its inherent reciprocal interests and its spiritual foundation. . . ." But since no sacrifice of sovereignty was countenanced, we can't imagine what the council would use in place of collective force should some sovereign power fail to reciprocate sufficiently or relax in its appreciation of the spirit. Delegates of the most conflicting views came away from Mackinac rejoicing over the party's escape from a crippling internal row. "But what good came of it at last?" Quoth little Peterkin. "Why that I cannot tell," said he: "But 'twas a famous victory."

★

BY CONTRAST WITH THE PERFORMANCE AT Mackinac, Secretary Hull's speech to the nation is bound to seem forthright. It does, in fact, clearly set the Administration's course in the direction of an international organization which will rely ultimately on the use of force to keep the peace. Mr. Hull's first major statement in more than a year of worldwide political turmoil is entitled to more study than we can give it at the moment of going to press, but beyond the pronouncement in favor of collective force, the address hardly leaves an initial impression of adequacy. In part it is a stale defense of past policies—Vichy, Franco Spain, Darlan—all of which are smugly credited with the military victories in the Mediterranean. We will have more to say about the

Secretary's address in another issue. For the present we can at least record our pleasure over this tacit acknowledgment that the people are entitled to an accounting.

★

ON ANOTHER SCORE IT IS REFRESHING TO find ourselves saluting the Secretary of State for a job well done. His reply to Vice-Admiral Storni, Argentina's naive and now retired Foreign Minister, was a model of plain talk in a worthy cause. On behalf of the Ramirez government, which has been clapping anti-fascists in jail on the charge of communism at such a rate as to make Argentina a dream world for Martin Dies, Admiral Storni had the effrontery to ask the United States for lend-lease aid in the way of armaments and machinery. Far from pretending that the equipment would be used to carry out his country's unfulfilled pledge to aid in the defense of the hemisphere, Storni based his request on the desirability of restoring Argentina "to the position of equilibrium to which she is entitled with respect to other South American countries." As for Argentina's "prudent neutrality," Storni argued that it would not be "chivalrous" to break relations with the Axis now that it is doomed to defeat. To all of which Hull replied that, far from being benevolently neutral toward the United Nations, the Ramirez government, like its predecessor, has been fostering Axis agents and giving favorable prices on newsprint to Axis-subsidized papers. Lend-lease aid was refused with a bluntness that shook the pampas, and the Admiral was further left to infer that unless his country changes its tune it can hardly expect a seat at the table when the United Nations meet to discuss post-war plans. Having insulted the Nazis in the course of his gauche fling at diplomacy, the Admiral has jockeyed his country into what Buenos Aires wits describe as "true neutrality"—it is now on bad terms with everybody.

★

ALL CREDIT TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND Maurice Karker, chairman of its Price Adjustment Board, for their forthright attitude in attacking the big-business lobby now trying to stampede Congress into repealing or revising the contract renegotiation law. Karker, himself chairman of the Jewel Tea Company, no small concern, blamed the drive on a selfish minority, "the wilful 10 per cent whose excesses in the past have been responsible for the controls imposed on business." Karker declared that despite renegotiation 60 per cent of the companies whose contracts had been revised still averaged about 16 per cent in profits on their volume of sales. In Britain the profits of war contractors have been held to 7½ per cent on the capital used in their business. War profits here are enormous. Profits after taxes last year were greater than profits before taxes in 1929—\$8,600,000,000 as against \$8,400,000,000. The argument that rene-

gotiation prevents the storing up of needed post-war reserves is utterly mendacious. Undistributed profits during the last four years total more than \$16,000,000,000, and many firms already have plants on which all capital costs have been amortized out of war contracts.

★

C. B. BALDWIN, AFTER THREE YEARS AS Administrator of the Farm Security Administration, retires with honor to take a post in the State Department. The small farmer and the agricultural worker never had a better friend or a more courageous champion. Though the President accepted the resignation with words of praise for both Baldwin and the FSA, it is feared that Baldwin's going may be the end for Farm Security. Baldwin's new post, as Italian area director for the State Department, is one in which he will face much the same problems and obstacles he encountered in his former job. The protest made by James De Le Cron in resigning as chief of the Food Supply Division of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs indicates some of the difficulties Baldwin will face. Le Cron, long a close associate of Vice-President Wallace but himself a middle-of-the-roader, complains of "divided authority, lack of administrative organization, and want of directive policy in the State Department." Le Cron's letter of resignation details the annoying procrastination, petty interference, and sheer incompetence which so hamstrung his food-supply work in Latin America that he quit in disgust. We wonder how much Baldwin, for all his enthusiasm and ability, will be able to achieve in the bureaucratic morass of the State Department.

★

WE HAVE CONGRATULATED OURSELVES FROM time to time on the fact that violations of basic civil rights are fewer in this war than in World War I. That there is no ground for complacency, however, is shown by two recent events. In Oklahoma City three teachers were discharged because they objected to a clause in their contract barring them from membership in a labor union. One of the teachers blotted out the union clause before signing the contract and wrote in its place, "I am still a citizen of the United States." The others merely attached letters saying that they signed the contracts under duress and pointing out that the anti-union section was in conflict with their rights as citizens. In each case the discharged teachers merely stated a fact. Yellow-dog contracts of this type have been outlawed by federal law for many years, but unfortunately an appeal to the courts takes time and money. Equally serious in its implications is the court-martialing of Sergeant Alton Levy of the Lincoln, Nebraska, Air Base for expressing disapproval of the army's discriminatory treatment of Negro troops. Levy is reported to have warned against the danger of race conflict arising from such

treatment, a warning that appears to have been justified, for later a riot broke out in his camp between Negroes and Americans of Mexican descent. It is gratifying to note that a group of distinguished citizens have appealed to Secretary Stimson and Judge Advocate General Cramer for a thorough review of the Levy case.

Congress Reconvenes

THE atmosphere of "getting on with the war" which has been evident in Washington for the past two months will be disturbed this week as Congress returns to its bitter partisan struggles. As was to be expected, none of the issues which rent Congress prior to adjournment has been solved by events during its recess. The chief responsibility before it remains, as was the case last January, the raising of sufficient taxes to head off inflation. It is expected that the House Ways and Means Committee will begin work on the tax bill no later than September 20. Although the President has asked for \$16,000,000,000 as a minimum, a considerable amount of pressure may be needed to get even the \$12,000,000,000 set as a goal by Secretary Morgenthau. Representative Carlson, sponsor of the Ruml skip-a-year tax bill, has already suggested that the surrender of Italy removes the necessity for higher taxes. Hope for a spending tax which would tap the existing surplus of purchasing power and help curb unnecessary buying seems slight unless a considerable group of Congressmen have been sobered by their visit to their constituencies. Significantly enough, the Republican Mackinac resolution ignores taxation.

Even before the question of taxes comes up for consideration, a demand will be made for revising the Selective Service Act to prevent the drafting of pre-Pearl Harbor fathers. Most Washington observers agree that any bill carrying such a provision would be vetoed and could not be passed over the veto. Nevertheless, we must expect some such attempt to upset the Administration's man-power policies.

The capitulation of Italy should have the effect of building a fire under Congress on the vital questions of post-war policy, both international and domestic. The Fulbright resolution "favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery . . . to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace," having been passed by the House, goes to the Senate, where it should force a vote on the greatly superior Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill resolution. In the domestic field action is urgently needed on plans for post-war employment along the lines of the proposals submitted six months ago by the National Resources Planning Board. Unless plans are drawn up this year and the necessary groundwork carefully laid, the country may find itself as unprepared for peace as it was in 1918. In this connection, immediate action is also

called f
revision
now sta
security
an extre
lems, bu
that som
the next

THE
nial
little wa
during t
defense
Harbor.
so bad a
pened if
Coast an
of east.
Marshall
less so fa
concerne
seem to b
lands Ea
rounds of
ammunit
the amm
Iceland"
rounds. I
that one
1941, wa
was to b
gathering

The ga
and the
in the pa
General
Japanese
self-prop
New Yor
forced ba
the Cauca
fields mig
It would
exaggerat
war bega
civilian ou
This lack
business b
the heroic
fought by
the Philip

called for on the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill for the revision of the Social Security Act. Under the law as it now stands demobilized service men have no social-security protection whatever. Congress has so far shown an extreme disinclination to grapple with post-war problems, but with the prospect, even though it be remote, that some of the service men may be demobilized before the next election, a change in attitude may be expected.

Our Good Luck

THE big question raised by General Marshall's biennial report as chief of staff is why so extraordinarily little war material was produced by American industry during the year and a half between the launching of the defense program in June, 1940, and the attack on Pearl Harbor. The report discloses a state of unpreparedness so bad as to make one wonder what would have happened if the Japanese had attempted to invade the West Coast and if the Nazis had decided to move west instead of east. "Immediately after Dunkirk in 1940," General Marshall says, "the British Isles were in effect defenseless so far as organized and equipped ground forces were concerned." A year later, in the summer of 1941, we seem to have been little better off. For when the Netherlands East Indies government begged for 25,000,000 rounds of a product as easily manufactured as small-arms ammunition, we had to "accept the hazard of reducing the ammunition reserve for the troops in movement to Iceland" in order to provide the Dutch with 7,000,000 rounds. How little this is may be seen from the fact that one plant due to get into production in October, 1941, was to turn out 7,000,000 rounds a day. "But that was to be too late," General Marshall says, "for the gathering storm in the Far East."

The gap between the scope of our military possibilities and the headlines on war production we were reading in the papers continued for months after Pearl Harbor. General Marshall tells how some six months after that Japanese attack we rushed "307 medium tanks and 90 self-propelled 105-mm. guns" to the Middle East from New York. This was at the time when the British were forced back to El Alamein and the Nazis had reached the Caucasus, and it looked as if the Near Eastern oil fields might be caught in a giant Nazi pincers movement. It would seem that production achievements were vastly exaggerated and that in the eighteen months before the war began business devoted most of its attention to civilian output, keeping armament to a leisurely sideline. This lackadaisical attitude, which permeated not merely business but the whole country, sets off in sharper relief the heroic story Marshall tells of the delaying action fought by our outnumbered and underequipped men in the Philippines. General Wainwright spoke for them

when he said, just before Corregidor fell, "Although beaten we are still unashamed." The shame belongs to all but those few, foremost among them the President, who tried to speed military and naval preparations in the face of general complacency and inertia.

Anyone who reads the Marshall report will see how much we owe to British and Russian resistance. Had both or either crumpled, we should have faced a long and disastrous war on our own soil.

IN THIS ISSUE

THE SHAPE OF THINGS	310
EDITORIALS	
The Appeal to the Italian People	309
Congress Reconvenes	312
Our Good Luck	313
ARTICLES	
Washington Fog by I. F. Stone	314
Let's Look at Labor. VIII. Russia and Labor Unity by Harold J. Laski	315
Ten Years Ago in <i>The Nation</i>	318
Pushing Japan Back by Donald W. Mitchell	319
Those Post-War Miracles by Francis Westbrook, Jr.	320
In the Wind	322
POLITICAL WAR	
Japan's Choice for India by John W. Gerber	323
Behind the Enemy Line by Argus	325
BOOKS AND THE ARTS	
Marsden Hartley by Paul Rosenfeld	326
Men and History by Jacques Barzun	326
Journals of the War by Marcus Duffield	328
The Tribune: First Phase by Louis Filler	330
Fiction in Review by Diana Trilling	330
In Brief	332
Music by B. H. Haggin	333
LETTERS TO THE EDITORS	334
CROSS-WORD PUZZLE by Jack Barrett	336

Editor and Publisher

FRED A. KIRCHWEY

Managing Editor
ROBERT BENDINER

Washington Editor
I. F. STONE

Literary Editor
MARGARET MARSHALL

Editor Political War Section
J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Associate Editors
KEITH HUTCHISON MAXWELL S. STEWART

Assistant Editor
J. MITCHELL MORSE

Music Critic
B. H. HAGGIN

Drama Critic
JOSEPH WOOD KAUTCH

Board of Contributing Editors

NORMAN ANGELL
LOUIS FISCHER

JONATHAN DANIELS
REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Business Manager
HUGO VAN ARX

Advertising Manager
MARY HOWARD ELLISON

Published weekly and copyright, 1943, in the U. S. A. by The Nation Association, Inc., 55 Fifth Ave., New York 3, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 15, 1929, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 318 Kellogg Building.

Washington Fog

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, September 10

THE news from New York is that the Sanitation Department had to sweep up twenty-two tons of confetti, ticker tape, and waste paper after the report of Italy's unconditional surrender. No such burden was imposed on the authorities here, where official celebration was restrained. At the State Department Wednesday noon the press room was jammed, and we all felt happy and excited over the news. A bet was made that such an occasion could not fail to get a rise even from Secretary Hull, but your correspondent, who was one of the optimists, must report that he lost the wager. When the Secretary was asked whether he cared to comment on the surrender (after receipt of the official announcement by General Eisenhower), he said—this is as nearly verbatim as the rules allow—that he had nothing to give us, that he had no comment to make, and that he had nothing to say at that time. It would have been nice if the Secretary had at least smiled and said something like, "I haven't any formal comment but you all know how I feel. It's swell." But I suppose I'm being utopian again.

At the White House the only word Steve Early had from the President was that this was Eisenhower's show.

Yesterday Hull was slightly more informative. He said he hoped to be able to comment more fully, more definitely, at a little later stage. This would seem to indicate that there might be something more in the wind, though it is unsafe to rely on deduction from the Secretary's nebulous phrases. On Wednesday, for example, he was asked whether the Anglo-American-Soviet Mediterranean Commission would deal primarily with military matters. Hull's somewhat perplexing answer was that this was why he was not in a position to give out any information. That sounded as though the commission would be largely military and as though news of it would therefore have to be obtained from the War Department. But this morning Harold Callender, who has an inside track at the department, reported in the *New York Times* that through its representation on the commission the Soviet Union "will participate in economic and political decisions touching Italy and the entire Mediterranean basin."

The whole question of the Mediterranean Commission is mystifying. On Saturday, September 4, Churchill made a long "off the record" talk at a National Press Club luncheon. "Authoritative-source" stories followed in the next day's papers. The best of these was the four-

column story by Paul W. Ward in the *Baltimore Sun*, and I recommend a careful reading of it to all who are interested in obtaining a clear view of British foreign policy at this time. Churchill is still the 1890 imperialist. At the luncheon it was revealed that there were under consideration plans, as yet tentative, for the creation of a Mediterranean Commission on which presumably Russia would have equal representation with Britain and the United States. Several days later this elicited some surprise "in the highest quarters" here. (I'm sorry to have to write this way but there are rules, and this will at least give the reader an idea of the fog in which reporters who cover foreign policy have to wander.) At the State Department Hull's first reaction seemed to be one of ignorance. It may be that the commission is a British idea and that the White House, with its close ties to the Vatican, is embarrassed at the prospect of Soviet participation in political decisions on Italy, even if Stalin is permitting the Russian Orthodox church to convoke a synod.

This talk of a three-power commission and General Eisenhower's announcement that the surrender terms had been approved by the Soviet as well as the American and British governments would seem to constitute the best news in some time on the diplomatic front. On what our government is planning for Italy's future I have, frankly, no real news. Neither has anyone else. I note that Salvemini and La Piana's excellent and indispensable new book, "What to Do with Italy," agrees generally with the Kingsbury Smith crypto-official article, Our Government's Plan for a Defeated Italy, in the August issue of the *American Mercury*, though the former is written from the anti-clerical left, the latter from the piously pro-State Department right. Salvemini and La Piana say we are in Italy to prevent a republican social revolution; Kingsbury Smith, to prevent anarchy. It seems fairly clear that we do not intend to force democracy on the Italian people. With one exception, official pronouncements here and abroad to the Italian people are uniformly lacking in any appeal that might be construed as an invitation to establish free government. The one exception was Secretary of War Stimson's reference yesterday to the Risorgimento as "a glorious chapter in the history of human freedom." The Secretary said it was our purpose to recreate this freedom. But, then, Stimson is unregenerate in his democratic beliefs, as demonstrated once before by his public appeal for the lifting of the embargo against the Spanish Republic.

Whatever our plans for Italy, an attempt will be made

Septem

to use B
Arthur
tional s
policies.
hower's
from the
before a
that by
we "enc
they wil
ments."

toward I
Emmanu
of ours t
the way
able to
anxiety
ruling cl
tection of
hasten a

I neve
to make
episode m

IT IS e
post-w
either i
standing is
Union, an
necessary
exponents
States, wil
case. But i
of which i
or underes

The her
Hitlerism
munist pro
sian Revolu
Europe and
portance o
that idea. A
zation exac
of monop
greater, an
dom is to

to use Eisenhower's victory to consolidate Hull's position. Arthur Krock has already discovered that the unconditional surrender was a triumph of State Department policies, though aided of course by "General Eisenhower's military expedients, which logically progressed from them." This is certainly putting a wee little cart before a very big horse. A Krock scoop is the discovery that by refusing to grant full recognition to De Gaulle we "encouraged hope in Axis-subjugated nations that they will be left free to select their own civil governments." What he really means is that by our attitude toward De Gaulle we encouraged trimmers like Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio to believe that no attachment of ours to democratic and popular forces would stand in the way whenever they decided that it had become profitable to shift sides. Another reflection of this is the anxiety of the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian ruling classes to jump our bandwagon and get the protection of our troops against popular uprisings. This may hasten a Balkan invasion.

I never dreamed that Hull would some day force us to make a hero of Sumner Welles. An even stranger episode may be in the making. The indications are that

Robert Murphy, now on his way home, will not return to North Africa. Department gossip suspects that Murphy has fallen out of favor with both Hull and Roosevelt because he was won over to full recognition of the French National Committee. Murphy seems to be regarded now as too favorable to the Gaullists. The President, it would seem, has never been closer in outlook to his Secretary of State. A new executive order is said to be in preparation which will greatly increase Hull's authority over Lend-Lease, Relief and Rehabilitation, the OEW, and other agencies operating abroad. One proposal is to make Stettinius and Lehman Assistant Secretaries of State. Silence, meanwhile, continues to reign over the unmarked political grave of Sumner Welles. I am told that the Secretary will wait until Congress convenes before announcing the Welles resignation and the name of his successor. It seems to be feared that an earlier announcement would give public opinion time to work up enough protest to make it difficult to obtain Senate confirmation of the new candidate for Under Secretary. If this is true, one would tend to conclude that Hull's choice is still someone of the type of Breckinridge Long or James Clement Dunn or Norman H. Davis.

Let's Look at Labor

VIII. RUSSIA AND LABOR UNITY

BY HAROLD J. LASKI

London, August 15

IT IS elementary to any rational thinking about the post-war world that there can be no secure peace either in Europe or the Far East save as a full understanding is reached between the United States, the Soviet Union, and ourselves. That need arises, in part, as a necessary recognition of Soviet power; and perhaps the exponents of *Realpolitik*, both here and in the United States, will regard this as the strongest argument in the case. But it arises, also, out of two other reasons, neither of which it seems to me can be legitimately overlooked or underestimated.

The heroic part played by the Soviet Union against Hitlerism has done more than twenty-five years of Communist propaganda to domesticate the idea of the Russian Revolution in the mind of the common peoples of Europe and Asia; we shall neglect, at our peril, the importance of finding terms of common friendship with that idea. And the development of the economic organization exacted by totalitarian war has made the danger of monopoly capitalism to the freedom of the workers greater, and not less, than it was in 1939. If that freedom is to be sure of protection and of growth in the

post-war period, it is, in my own judgment, essential that the working classes of the three countries shall have reached a working arrangement before the war ends. Without it, there is the gravest danger that internal differences in each country will be used, as in Germany, Italy, and France, as the basis upon which the counter-revolution, of which Hitlerism is merely one expression, sweeps to power. It has therefore become imperative to find terms of mutual accommodation between the Soviet Union and the working classes of Britain and America as a safeguard against the danger that, even after the defeat of the Axis powers, the impersonal forces of our civilization may drag us, a third time, to a battle for the supremacy of the world.

It is well known that Britain and the Soviet Union are, so far as the labor movement is concerned, engaged in at least a preliminary effort to find these common terms. I do not exaggerate the importance of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. I recognize that, so far, its significance has been rather in the realm of propaganda than of policy. I agree that it has not even sought to grapple with the delicate and difficult problems which arise out of the different status and purpose of the trade

unions in Britain and in the Soviet Union. I do not deny that it seems to serve rather as a gesture of goodwill than as an institution which seeks to shape events. But it is important that the committee is there. The very fact that it exists provides a basis upon which, at a later stage, a more adequate superstructure can be built.

In the 1943 conference of the British Labor Party I was authorized by its National Executive to give a pledge that, if the Soviet Union agreed, a delegation would proceed to Moscow at the earliest possible moment to discuss all outstanding differences between our two countries, and to find, if possible, a basis of lasting friendship between them. That pledge, I add, had the approval of the three ex-chairmen of the Second International—the eminent Belgian statesmen MM. de Brouckère and Camille Huysmans, and the Dutch Minister M. Albarda. They agreed with us that it would be the height of folly to maintain in the generation after the war the divisions within the working-class movement which, in the inter-war years, did so much to weaken its strength and frustrate its purposes.

The delegation has not yet gone because we are not of the opinion that the favorable moment has come.* But I reveal no secret when I say that we have reason to know that it will be welcome in Moscow, and that it is likely that it will proceed there within this next year to attempt to heal the divisions which have done so much harm. I do not know, of course, whether it will succeed. Its task, on any showing, will be both arduous and delicate; and it is obvious that, fairly early in its negotiations, it will become necessary to relate its discussions to the tasks of the working-class parties in Europe, if its agreements are to prove effective. The point I am concerned to make at this stage is the simple one of a growing recognition, both in London and in Moscow, that, in Benjamin Franklin's admirable phrase, the working classes in all countries must hang together in peace as well as in war or else they will hang separately.

II

The American trade-union movement has refused, so far as the A. F. of L. is concerned, to be a party to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee; and I gather that historical reasons prevented Sir Walter Citrine from making an approach to the C. I. O. On the political side, I have no knowledge of the attitude of the various divisions of the American Socialist movement in regard to the attempt to rediscover the terms on which the international working class might find unity. What, at this distance, alone seems clear is the fact that the generation of internecine conflict, both in the industrial and in the political field, between the American Communists on the one hand and on the other the American Socialists and trade unionists who are unable to accept the Com-

munist Party creed, has dug an abyss which, so far, not even the partnership of war has been able to bridge. Though Hitlerism, whether in its European or in its Asiatic form, is not less the enemy of the American worker than of the Russian, it does not appear that the common danger has made the leaders of American labor or American socialism recognize that there are common interests which require an appropriate organization for their protection.

And those common interests will not end with the achievement of military victory. All of us in the working-class movement who are willing to face the future realistically must recognize how grave is the danger that though the United Nations win the war they may lose the peace. More, they must grasp the fact that losing the peace means, in essence, the emergence of circumstances in which there is a relentless drift to a third world war; and the main price, of both that drift and that war, would be paid, as the price of this war is being paid, by the working class. A third world war, if it were to come, would come because we failed to establish, after victory, those relations of production which, by making possible an economy of expansion, would enable us to establish conditions in which the Four Freedoms would be more than rhetorical phrases. Without an economy of expansion there can be no international security from aggression; without it all social policy is bound to be subordinated to strategic considerations. The alternative to an economy of expansion is a new industrial feudalism. And if that develops, I must be permitted to remark that the American workers will face a prospect not less bleak than that by which the workers of Europe and Asia will be confronted. I submit, with great respect, that the leaders of American labor, whether on its industrial or on its political side, ought every so often to reread the report of such a body as the La Follette Committee on Civil Liberties, and ask themselves what would happen to their gains of the last ten years if there were once again in the White House a President who assumed an identity between democracy and laissez faire.

I assume, in short, that any intelligent citizen now realizes that nations, however powerful, are interdependent; that modern technology and above all modern means of communication have made a policy of isolation as obviously impossible as it is unwise. And I infer from this the need to find ways and means of protecting the common interests of the workers in a unified world, just as business men find ways and means of protecting their special common interests. The clear implication of this, in my submission, is the folly of refusing to consider how the interests of American workers can be integrated with those of Britain and the U. S. S. R. The fact that our political systems are different is not, in my judgment, the decisive obstacle that the American Federation of Labor assumes it to be. I am willing to admit that the

* Sir Walter Citrine, however, went to Moscow several months ago.—
EDITORS THE NATION.

Sept
U. S. S.
guilty, a
crimes.
U. S. S.
that the
in the U
sion afte
depends
economy
Quite
leaders
assume
merely l
ment. F
shows th
do so;
period o
recovery
have bee
quarters
shape a
United I

U. S. S. R. has made mistakes, committed blunders, been guilty, as the execution of Ehrlich and Alter testifies, of crimes. It is still the fact that whatever weakens the U. S. S. R. weakens the working class all over the world, that the transition to an effective democratic government in the U. S. S. R. is a function of its security from aggression after the war, and that its security from aggression depends, in its turn, upon our ability to organize an economics of expansion with the coming of peace.

Quite frankly, it seems to me unpardonable for the leaders of American labor, industrial or political, to assume that they can secure an economics of expansion merely by exercising pressure upon their own government. For, first of all, the history of the Roosevelt regime shows that, acting alone, they are not strong enough to do so; otherwise, the New Deal would not, in the period of peace, have been so constant a struggle between recovery and reform; nor would it, since Pearl Harbor, have been driven by big business to retreat into winter quarters. And, secondly, by refraining from helping to shape a common policy for the workers among the United Nations, they gravely detract from the influence

these are in a position to exert in Europe and Asia. It is, indeed, not untrue to say that most of the dangers we shall face when the peace comes, many indeed of the dangers which are emerging as we move slowly to victory, come from the fact that the leaders of American labor cease to think once their vision reaches the frontiers of the United States, and that they have little more than spasmodic emotions about those international problems in which their people, not less than ours, are now inextricably involved. Until they come to understand that the thing we call Hitlerism, whether in its German or Italian or Japanese form, is a world phenomenon which summarizes vital and dangerous tendencies in the United States and Britain as well as among the Axis powers, they will be quite unable to formulate a policy proportionate to the dangers they confront. Until they understand that there is only a temporary truce in the battle they have been waging with counter-revolution in their own country and that, with the armistice, their historical enemy will begin again to deploy his forces against them, they will wholly fail to grasp the nature of the problem they face. And the sooner they recognize that,



RESURRECTION

to solve their problem, they need all the power and influence the workers of Britain and the U. S. S. R. can bring to their support, the sooner they will set their problem in the framework which gives them the hope of success.

III

I infer from this analysis that it is as wise as it is obligatory for American labor to play its full part with British labor in arriving at an understanding with the U. S. S. R. No one who looks carefully at the nature of the regimes which may develop among the United Nations when Hitlerism is defeated, who measures the significance of the social and economic forces implied in the candidatures for power which seek, and may well obtain, the patronage of the American State Department and the British Foreign Office, can avoid the conclusion that the Soviet Union is the central support upon which the future of working-class interests depends. In the degree that it is strong, they will be strong; in the degree that it is weak, they will be weak too. To arrive at a *modus vivendi* with its leaders is essential for two things. It is the one sure way to prevent the working-class divisions of the inter-war years from being perpetuated; if these divisions continue, monopoly capitalism will have little difficulty in establishing an authoritarian empire. It is, in the second place, the one sure way to safeguard the democratic element in the difficult and delicate relationship of capitalist democracy. For the stronger the U. S. S. R. is, the more able it will be to fulfil the potentialities of planned production for community consumption; and the greater the degree of that fulfilment, the more necessary will it be for Britain and the United States to embark upon that economics of expansion in the absence of which democratic government has no great prospects in the post-war years.

I do not argue for one moment that the *modus vivendi* will be easy to achieve. Twenty-five years of the *cordon sanitaire* have made the leaders of the U. S. S. R. nationalist, suspicious, secretive; and the immense burdens their people have borne since Hitler's attack have made them consciously virtuous in a degree that is irritating to the point of resentment. Moreover, as the midwives of the Socialist revolution, they tend to assume an attitude of effortless superiority which makes the particular of their special experiences seem to them, as it were, a universal image before which all other nations must bow.

Self-righteousness of this kind is an inevitable phase in any people which has wrung victory from disaster. Our business is to be patient with its gestures, to penetrate beyond them to the foundations they never wholly conceal. The Russian Revolution is a stage in the completion of that process of human emancipation in which the English civil wars, 1776, and 1789 were vital epochs. The present conflict, seen in its proper perspective, is essentially an attempt to arrest that process in

the interests of privilege. It will be a tragedy indeed if the leaders of American labor fail to recognize the opportunity that is theirs.

[This is the last of a series of eight articles on the problems confronting American labor.]

10 Years Ago in "The Nation"

THE TRIAL of the five men charged with the burning of the Reichstag has been set for September 21. . . . The chiefs of the Hitler government are undoubtedly the real incendiaries of the Reichstag. . . . The trial before the Nazi court at Leipzig will be a bloody farce. But the highly qualified international tribunal of noted jurists which is sitting in The Hague has already brought to light so much that proves the guilt of Göring, Goebbels, and their companions that the German government will probably not dare to carry out its murderous intentions.—September 6, 1933.

WE ARE DEEPLY SHAKEN by the black eye of Huey Long. It has been established since the incident at the Sands Point Bath Club that at least half the population of this country has longed to sock the Kingfish in the eye.—September 13, 1933.

LAST WEEK the *Reichspost*, the Dollfuss organ, was forced to admit that the Austrian Fascists control most important parts of the postal system of the country, that they open letters and telegrams, listen in on telephone conversations, and exercise a rigid censorship. A government that has permitted the National Socialist foe to gain and hold such strongholds in its own body politic cannot long endure.—September 13, 1933.

NEXT TO THE FRAILTY and corruption of local administration, the greatest threat to the success of NRA consists of sabotage from within. . . . There is evidence that deputies authorized to obtain codes from great industries utilized their contacts with great industrialists to feather their own nests.—PAUL Y. ANDERSON, September 13, 1933.

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY has announced the domestic rates which will be available to consumers who buy current from Muscle Shoals. . . . For small users, those whose appliances, besides lights, include an iron, a toaster, a vacuum cleaner, it is estimated that the rate will be about \$1.50 monthly. This contrasts with a domestic rate of \$4.57 in adjacent Knoxville and \$4.50 in New York. . . . The New York Times editorially views the new program at Muscle Shoals as a means "to beat into submission an industry which seems to have been singled out as an exception to the current theories of fair competition." To chide the Administration for ignoring the principles of fair competition in dealing with an industry which has never suffered competition of any kind, and has reciprocated for this privilege with unconscionable profiteering, impresses us as highly amusing.—September 27, 1933.

COR
Qu
of
well as
Pacific t
Japan
earlier m
one obje
Owing p
their we
it soon a
ever, co
its comm
problem
power. V
ery of
contract
done at

Amer
conquest
are of c
our air
and now
Pearl H
Japanese
ships in
Today t
ships of
"North
ties, an
sixteen
lar carri
cruiser
mission
now on
future.
have bee
ity than
of dama
Pearl H

It is
to aban
risk disp
dog tena
no long
the Japa
them me
In the

Pushing the Japanese Back

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

CONCENTRATION on Japanese problems at the Quebec conference was an indication that the tide of war is running in our favor in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic. In fact, in every sector of the Pacific the enemy is now on the defensive.

Japan's present difficulty is the direct result of its earlier method of conquest. Instead of concentrating on one objective at a time, it struck in all directions at once. Owing partly to the mistakes of the Allies but mainly to their weakness, its arms were everywhere successful, and it soon acquired an enormous empire. Its conquests, however, could be held only loosely by the limited forces at its command, and their defense presented severe logistic problems because of their distance from the centers of power. With any increase of enemy force on the periphery of its holdings, it would naturally be obliged to contract them and either abandon outposts as it has done at Kiska or risk large losses as in the Solomons.

American strength in areas adjoining the Japanese conquests has in fact grown enormously. Official figures are of course unobtainable, but for more than a year our air power has outmatched the Japanese in quality and now is doubtless superior in quantity as well. After Pearl Harbor the navy, fortunately about equal to the Japanese in carrier strength, had just three sound battle-ships in the Pacific to the enemy's twelve or fourteen. Today the Pacific fleet, reinforced by the three battle-ships of the Idaho class from the Atlantic, the six new "North Carolinas," three of the Pearl Harbor casualties, and perhaps two new 45,000-ton "Iowas," has sixteen to eighteen battlewagons. Also at least ten regular carriers, some of them of the 10,000-ton converted-cruiser class, have been or are very close to being commissioned. The rate of reinforcement of the Pacific fleet, now one vessel a day, will increase still further in the future. It is hardly likely that the Japanese dockyards have been idle, but they are of materially smaller capacity than ours and have been encumbered with the repair of damaged vessels. The naval loss ratio, even counting Pearl Harbor, has been heavily in our favor.

It is these facts which explain the Japanese decision to abandon the fruitless foothold at Kiska rather than risk disproportionate losses by trying to maintain it. Bulldog tenacity, having failed to pay dividends, is apparently no longer being practiced. However, the strategic sense the Japanese have gained from experience should make them more rather than less dangerous in the days ahead.

In the southwestern Pacific as at Kiska the enemy

was wise in not choosing to squander large forces in a probably losing fight along a line of outposts of no great strategic value. The fact that no attempt was made to hold them is an excellent sign, however, that the initiative is slowly but very definitely passing into American hands; of course, our gains in all zones have been as yet little more than pin pricks to the Japanese, and pricks far indeed from that nation's heart.

In view of the encouraging setup, what moves can reasonably be expected in the near future? Are we now ready for the decisive offensive?

In order to arrive at an answer we must consider certain fundamental facts about the Japanese war. It is, in the first place, a conflict carried on over areas so great as to dwarf those of any previous struggle. The logistics problems of both sides, but especially of the United States, are tremendous. Since the effectiveness of any force diminishes in direct ratio to its distance from its base of supply, an offensive deep into enemy waters requires much more than a margin of superiority; it requires, rather, overwhelming superiority.

In the second place, the offensive against Japan must not be allowed to interfere with prosecution of the war against Hitler. Sufficient force for a vigorous holding campaign is essential, but beyond this the effort must be made with that strength, mainly naval, which is not urgently needed in the European conflict.

With these limitations in mind, it is fairly clear that a major offensive in the Pacific must await developments elsewhere. The Japanese abandonment of Kiska is of only negative value. Planes now in production will enable us to bomb the northern Japanese islands, but until such aerial softening up can be provided, amphibious moves against the Kuriles are hardly likely. Action to test the obstacles on the southern route to Tokyo are sure to be continued. Hit-and-run raids by cruiser-carrier task forces, much like the recent expedition against Marcus Island, will form part of this pattern. Large numbers of the "stationary airplane carriers" north of the equator can be attacked with damaging results.

The success of this program, a necessary preliminary to a major campaign against Japan in the Pacific, is more threatened at the moment by the renewed drive for a separate air force than by the resistance of the enemy. An absolute essential to a successful campaign by the navy is the control and centralized direction of its own aviation. The divorce of air power from sea power, already proposed in Congress, would repeat an experiment which,

when tried in the British navy, proved disastrous. The navy and its air corps are at present moving efficiently and smoothly together toward a victory that is in sight. If at such a point we abandon a type of warfare which is bringing results in favor of untried military "get-rich-quick" schemes, we deserve a very rude awakening. In the present war close coordination of all weapons and groups has been the key to victory.

As it happens, the Pacific is not, at the moment, the most likely arena for the next big battle against Japan. The most logical major move is unquestionably an invasion of Burma. Stakes here are so large as to justify considerable expenditure. The reopening of land communications with China and the resultant implementing of that nation's war effort would alone make such a move worth while. The reconquest of important oil reserves, the redemption of Anglo-American prestige, and the acquisition of bases for even more direct land and ultimately for air offensives are other advantages which would follow victory on this battlefield.

The only doubtful factor in a thrust here is sea power. The nearby Indian army is fifteen times as large as the estimated force of 100,000 Japanese in Burma. Superiority in air power is ours. It is to be presumed that the recent shifts in command made by the British have been partly for the purpose of organizing a more energetic back-of-the-lines system of supply—a fatal weakness of

last year's invasion attempt. And even in shipping and naval power the United Nations are far better off than they were last year. The surrender of Italy, the multiplication of Allied air bases in the Mediterranean, and the output of British shipyards have produced so overwhelming a naval preponderance that diversions can now safely be made to the Bay of Bengal. It may be necessary to afford the protection of carriers to important troop convoys, and it is of course highly desirable to coordinate a land invasion of Burma with naval moves designed to keep the Japanese fleet in the Pacific.

Burma is not, however, an ultimate Allied objective any more than the Kuriles or Wake or New Guinea. Its conquest is an important preliminary step in driving land wedges through Japanese-held territory to the China Sea. If we can take this step and at the same time push our bases west and north in the South Pacific, we shall have an excellent chance of narrowing and finally severing the Japanese line of communications with the Indies. These possessions, cut off from Japanese support, could then be reduced at moderate cost. Then Japan would be near defeat.

These plans cannot be carried out in the immediate future, for we are not yet ready to concentrate all our efforts against our enemy in the Pacific. But our strength is steadily growing, and it is likely that the coming months will see the preliminary moves.

Those Post-War Miracles

BY FRANCIS WESTBROOK, JR.

THE fantasies of advertising and publicity are arousing in the American public, suffering from a war-time shortage of consumer goods, the expectancy that when the day of peace comes they will be able to cash in their war bonds and buy industrial miracles. The single curb on promises has been the limit of imagination. Automobiles, selling at temptingly low prices, will be made of strange new materials and assume shapes ranging from fried eggs to tanks. Business men will commute a hundred or more miles in helicopters, landing on the roofs of office buildings and in the back yards of their "suburban" homes. People will live in "dream" houses—will pass the day watching the events of the world on television screens while all kinds of electrical devices run these houses far more skilfully than could any human hand. The new vacuum cleaners, radios, refrigerators, and washing machines will make the pre-war models as obsolete as a Model T Ford.

To say that all of these dreams are impossible would be foolhardy, but it is misleading the public to give

the impression that they will materialize right after the peace. The truth is that the first post-war models of most durable consumer goods, of automobiles and refrigerators, for example, will closely resemble those turned out in 1942. The radical changes, of which there will certainly be many, will not appear for at least a year—in some cases much longer. This time lag can have serious consequences, affecting the entire conversion of industry from war to peace-time production.

Stated in its simplest terms, the problem is this: the necessity of converting industry as fast as possible and of keeping employment at a maximum through the demobilization period indicates a return to models that can be placed in production at the earliest moment, but the consuming public, misled by "juicy" advertising, is expecting revolutionary products. A definite sales resistance is therefore bound to develop when the old models appear. People will ask themselves whether they cannot make the best of what they have until the improved goods come on the market. Even when the changes do

begin to appear, they will be gradual. Meanwhile a monkey wrench will have been thrown into the conversion process. The more thoughtful industrialists are worried.

The problem is most clearly illustrated by the prospects in the automobile industry, which in 1941 was little short of a four-billion-dollar business and is generally considered a keystone of the American economy. Though the entire capacity of almost every automobile factory today is engaged in war production, much of the machinery for producing peace-time cars in the 1941 volume is available in storage, only waiting to be moved back into place to turn out the latest pre-war models. It has been estimated that this can be accomplished in three or four months, while to retool and prepare designs for models incorporating many of the proposed changes would require a year at least. It will be remembered that when Ford changed from the Model T to the Model A some years ago, all production was stopped for about this length of time.

The manufacturer will be influenced by three legitimate considerations: the desire to place a salable car on the market as soon as possible; the obligation to maintain the greatest possible employment during conversion—a complete retooling for radically new models would mean a year or more of idleness for a great number of workers; and the possible necessity of meeting a transportation crisis caused by a shortage of usable cars at the end of the war. It has been estimated that automobiles are wearing out at the rate of two and one-half million a year. If the war should be long, the situation could become serious.

The consumer, in deciding whether or not to buy a new car, will be influenced first by how badly he needs one and secondly by how important he thinks the eventual improvements will be. These have been pictured in glowing terms with very little reference to how long it will take to make them realities. The consumer will need some clear information about what is coming and how soon.

The most important advances are likely to be in the use of new materials, such as plastics, the light metals now widely used in aircraft, and new tough alloys. These alloys, because of their strength and heat resistance, will make possible far lighter engines. It has been predicted that use of these materials may bring the weight of some models down to 1,000 pounds. Lightness, coupled with the use of 100-octane gasoline such as is now produced in great quantity for war planes, should increase mileage and reduce running costs. Innumerable other developments have been promised, including tops of the transparent plastic now used in the gun turrets of bombers, air-conditioned interiors, motors at the rear instead of in front, and automobiles that will fly.

Coming down to probabilities, it seems likely that a few years after the war the consumer will be able to

buy a light-weight, low-gas-consuming car for around \$400. But he will not get it immediately, and he may never see the more fantastic promises realized. A recent statement by George Romney, managing director of the National Industrial Conference Board, throws some light on the possible length of the consumers' wait. Romney said that he did not know of a single firm doing experimental work on post-war cars. All are too busy with war production.

The picture for the whole range of durable consumer goods presents the same pattern. The impression has been created, for example, that television will be universally available after the peace; yet television's greatest handicap, its inability to carry beyond the horizon, has not been satisfactorily overcome. Until some economical system of relays has been devised, television probably will be confined to congested population areas. Its maximum effective range at present is about seventy miles.

FM—frequency modulation—radio seems to hold greater promise for the immediate post-war period. It was well on its way before Pearl Harbor, and it is reasonable to expect that it will be generally available far sooner than some other products that have not progressed beyond the "promise" stage. While conventional radio is limited to 5,000 vibrations or cycles per second, FM is capable of the entire range of the human ear—from 16 to 16,000 cycles per second—thus giving full value to music and speech.

Developments are to be expected in the electrical appliance field. Refrigerators have been promised which will not only be made of "exciting" new materials (largely plastic), but will also be capable of greater temperature control and of meeting the requirements of the expanding frozen-food industry. Electric stoves will have new temperature controls and automatic devices. Work is said to be under way on a washing machine that will wash, rinse, and dry, all for the turning of a switch. An improved steam iron is on the way. Something may also be expected from the vacuum-cleaner industry. But in the great majority of cases the first post-war models will be to all intents and purposes the same as the old; only as experimentation and retooling are completed, will new designs be offered.

There will be exceptions of course. Some manufacturers had important new products "all ready to go" when war was declared. These will be available immediately. Aviation, concerning which some of the wildest predictions have been made, may almost bear them out, especially in the commercial-transport branch. While production of the aviation industry totaled only \$280,000,000 in 1938, it is expected this year to exceed the astronomical figure of \$20,000,000,000, and possibly to double that in 1944. Its unprecedented facilities can be converted with relative ease to the production of civilian planes. The production of transport planes already is

enormous, and some of these might be put directly into commercial use.

Commercial transportation both of freight and passengers is expected to progress faster than private operation. The National Resources Planning Board has estimated that "within the next decade or two air travel in the United States will assume approximately 70 per cent of present-day Pullman rail travel, or about six billion passenger-miles"; according to the OWI this would mean the transportation of about twenty million people a year. The Civil Aeronautics Board more optimistically predicts that this volume will be reached in 1946.

Ownership of private planes will come more slowly, partly because operators will need a great deal of training and partly because the war-plane factories are not building models that would be suitable for private use. Development and conversion must come first. The helicopter may help solve a number of problems, especially the remoteness of landing fields, but here again considerable development work will be required.

Much of the "dream" advertising, it may be noted, has been by companies that hope to crash new markets. Established manufacturers of automobiles, electrical appliances, and so on have been in general more conservative, and are now genuinely worried. The most fantastic promises have been made by manufacturers of war materials who know that they will have to turn to civilian lines to keep their vastly expanded facilities in operation. For example, plastics companies are looking for new outlets in automobiles, refrigerators, and the building trades. And it has been intimated that the aviation industry will turn excess capacity to the production of automobiles. Such concerns can best buck the established competition by coming out with radically new products—by making a direct assault on the consumer's imagination. Companies of various kinds are thinking along these lines, and their publicity has been abetted by the fertile imagination of advertising men, by war profits, and by a Treasury policy of making money spent for advertising deductible from income tax under certain circumstances.

Although the necessities of conversion seem to dictate a return to the models that can be most quickly brought out, the manufacturer has a responsibility to the public to turn out the best article he can—one incorporating a maximum of worth-while developments—as soon as is economically feasible. The unscrupulous will feel tempted to sell up a hungry market on the old product and save the new stuff as bait for a time when the going is harder. A progressive change in style and models has long been used as a device to put off the consumers' saturation point. New developments have been deliberately held up or parceled out bit by bit. It would be a great scandal if the hard-won technical advances of the war period, many of them developed with govern-

ment money, were exploited in this manner. A healthy deterrent may be provided by the competition of war industries, which will certainly try to break into civilian markets with every conceivable type of product. The trouble is that they, too, will require time for experimentation and conversion.

In the Wind

A BOOKLET "intended to help defeat the New Deal in the coming national election" is sponsored by Senator E. H. Moore of Oklahoma. It is entitled "The Other Freedom—Freedom of Opportunity," and here are two samples of its wares: "If we are to have freedom of opportunity we must keep open to our youth progress through inequality." . . . "It was a small group meeting in a beer parlor in Bergesbaden [*sic*] that began the movement that set the world on fire by this war. It can be a small group meeting in some quiet place that will offer the plan of peace that will end the conflict and usher in a period of peace."

REPRESENTATIVE LEROY JOHNSON of California recently told the Sacramento Masons that "the white man deserves his place in the world," that "ignorant, prejudiced, biased human beings in other parts of the world" should be taught "intelligence, self-denial, and self-control," and that the need of the hour was "world stabilization where wars would cease and the white man would not be depleted."

CLUBS AND DISCUSSION GROUPS throughout the country will soon be granted the privilege of seeing a film prepared by the Association of National Advertisers, "The Fifth Freedom." *Editor and Publisher* describes it as an attack on grade labeling. "In a dramatization, exaggerated for effect, it presents the ultimate in what might happen should regimentation of merchandise become universal."

A LETTER to the editor of the New York *Daily News* offers the following information about brain food: "The strongest argument I know of against vegetarianism is the British people, who have been known for centuries as beef eaters. I don't know whether beef is a brain food, or what; but anyway, we fought for freedom from the British in 1776, and they got us back in 1942 without firing a shot."

PARACHUTE SILK rejected by the armed forces will henceforth be available without restriction, the WPB announces, for the manufacture of baby pants and women's underwear.

FESTUNG EUROPA: The Vichy government is mobilizing cripples for light work—in Germany. . . . Eight hundred miles of railroad track have been removed from Belgium to help meet the shortage in Germany. . . . Dutch Nazis who have been sending their children to special Nazi schools will now have to return them to the regular Dutch schools; the children will have to put up with the silence and contempt of their schoolmates in an effort to win converts.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.]

PC

LIT

streets,
not nec
frustrati
dismal p
nese ma
victory f

The c
Chandra
member
early 19
Cooperat
the right
leader. I
Independ
Gandhi's
Bose tim
rade." In
mayor of
dent of t

But th
Bose bey
rewarded
impairme
disloyalty
said that
surpassed

In 193
Congress
many Ind
ment. Ne
organizati
phrases,"
found pla
of the Na
mobilize

And in
Bose finis
Berlin, wh
of the mi
violence f
In June
was timed
sive: the

Japan's Choice for India

BY JOHN W. GERBER

LITTLE news has come out of India during the past two months. Nehru is silent behind prison walls, and if the people continue to demonstrate on the streets, our papers have not reported it. But silence does not necessarily imply submission. India still boils with frustration and unrest. It is the scene of one of the most dismal political failures of the United Nations, and Japanese machinations are working to turn that failure into victory for the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

The central figure in the Japanese campaign is Subhas Chandra Bose, beloved by millions of Indians who remember him as a fiery patriot and leftist leader. In the early 1920's Bose became associated with Gandhi's Non-Cooperation League. He speedily rose to prominence as the right-hand man of C. R. Das, the renowned Bengal leader. In 1928 he joined Nehru in forming the Indian Independence League, which once and for all rejected Gandhi's advocacy of dominion status. Nehru described Bose time and time again as "a dear and valued comrade." In 1930, while he was in jail, Bose was elected mayor of Calcutta, and later, in 1938 and 1939, president of the Congress Party.

But the party's policy of non-violence finally irritated Bose beyond endurance. His nationalist activity had been rewarded by more than a dozen jail sentences, by serious impairment of his health, and by what he considered the disloyalty of his associates to his person. It has also been said that he was jealous of Nehru, whose influence alone surpassed his.

In 1939 Bose resigned from the presidency of the Congress Party to organize the Forward Bloc, in which many Indians saw the hope of a real revolutionary movement. Nehru knew better. He described it as a "rival organization" to the Congress. "Under cover of fine phrases," he said, "adventurist and opportunist elements found platforms. I could not help but think of the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, whose way had been to mobilize mass support for one program only to utilize it for an entirely different purpose."

And indeed Nehru's words proved prophetic. When Bose finished a jail term in 1941, he made his way to Berlin, where he was apparently taken into the councils of the mighty. He had discarded the principle of non-violence forever.

In June of this year he moved to Tokyo. His arrival was timed to coincide with Japan's big political offensive: the promise of "independence" for Burma and

preparations for independence in the Philippines; the award of four Shan states to Thailand; the attempt to "appease" the Chungking government. In a speech broadcast to India from transmitters in Tokyo, Rangoon, Bangkok, and Singapore, Subhas Chandra Bose set the keynote for his campaign. "The moment has arrived for all Indians who love liberty to act," he said. "Whatever action is taken in war time requires military discipline and complete loyalty to the cause. It is for this reason that I appeal to all Indians in East Asia to draw together under a single leader and to prepare for a hard fight."

Bose implemented his words by action. The Japanese held about 60,000 Indian prisoners of war and had been subjecting them to constant propaganda. The Japanese would be victorious. They would liberate India. The prisoners must compose the vanguard of an "army of liberation" to fight against the hated British and to bring ultimate peace and contentment to the suffering people of India. Bose announced the formation of such an army, setting his goal at 300,000 men, and started a vigorous drive to recruit Indians in Japanese-dominated territory.

Truthfully or not, Bose declared that he had agents at work in India. "It is no secret," he announced, "that many men from our army have been sent to work at home among the enemy." Simultaneously this advice was broadcast to India: "Brave Indians, you must undergo strenuous training, just as we are doing here, in preparation for the great day. Don't worry about arms and ammunition. They will come. Do all you can to form widespread secret organizations. Brace yourself for action and sacrifice."

From Tokyo Bose went to Singapore, where he set up permanent headquarters. The powerful Singapore radio—formerly British—was turned over to him for recruiting and the dissemination of nationalist propaganda. Its broadcasts appeal to every conceivable Indian prejudice, obviously seeking to intensify antagonism toward the British and to muster popular support for the "army of liberation." One of the mainsprings of this propaganda is constant praise of Mahatma Gandhi, who, it is stated explicitly, sides with Bose. "News" items such as this are frequent:

Confidence that Mahatma Gandhi and a large number of his followers will extend their whole-hearted moral if not physical support once the Indian army successfully penetrates into India was expressed by Subhas Chandra Bose. . . . The fiery Indian national leader declared that

FAITH IN THE PEOPLE

Every new piece of information that comes from Italy underlines the role played by the people in its surrender. The pressure which they exercised on the Badoglio government to get their country out of the war never relaxed. Sometimes, as in Milan, their demonstrations were given definite political character by the Socialists, who demanded the abdication of the king. At other times they were not so articulate, but their clamor for peace was always inextricably linked with hatred of fascism and its leaders. In every occupied country in Europe the same feelings prevail. They prevail in Spain, and everywhere else where fascism has flourished. The popular will for freedom is indomitable after these infamous years of suppression and tyranny. That has been the reason for our unflinching faith in a victorious outcome of the war. No criticism we have made of the diplomacy of expediency or of the policy of appeasement has nullified our belief in the people of Europe. Against every stratagem, against every Machiavellianism, against every scheme to control their will by programs of relief or charity works the determination of the European masses to destroy fascism once and forever.

although Mahatma Gandhi may not support fighting with arms because of his steadfast adherence to the principle of non-violence, it is certain that he will not oppose us.

Another appeal is to Indian women. "I wish," said Bose, "that there be an army of the heroic women of India, in which are included those intrepid women who would carry a sword in their hand like the Rani of Jhansi, and use it with the same daring and bravery with which the Rani of Jhansi used it in the first war for Indian independence in 1857." Bose succeeded in organizing a vanguard for his women's army in Singapore.

Hunger, which the British admit has reached near-famine proportions in India, provides Bose with one of his most effective weapons. "When we have annihilated the British in India," he promises, "famine will automatically disappear." He offered the Indian government, apparently with no strings attached, 100,000 tons of rice, to be delivered as the government saw fit. Day after day the offer was hammered home:

Although it is four days now since Subhas Chandra Bose broadcast his offer to supply 100,000 tons of rice to the famine-stricken people of India, the British authorities have not yet made any reply. Meanwhile men, women, and children are dropping dead in the streets of Calcutta. The British authorities have only made arrangements to remove their corpses promptly.

As this poison flows into India, Bose energetically enlists support for his movement throughout the Japanese Empire. He personally carried his recruiting drive into Burma and Thailand in a one-month tour, during which he held long conversations with Ba Maw, Premier of the new "independent" Burma, and with Sonngam, the Thai Premier, who was celebrating the acquisition of the four Shan states. When he returned to Singapore Bose announced that Burma and Thailand had assured him of their "full support" and that "concrete strategic plans for the offensive against the British in India" had emerged from conversations with the Japanese commander-in-chief in Burma.

Shortly thereafter, in mid-August, Bose stated that his army was ready. "I want to inform my comrades in the army and among the civil population that the Indian national army is now on the move," he asserted. "It is a long way from Shonan [Singapore] to Delhi. Therefore we must now begin to pack. During the next two months a large portion of the army will be on the road to India."

There is no reason to doubt that Bose meant what he said. We don't know the size of his army, but Indians with whom I have spoken in this country believe it probable that he was able to recruit a large proportion of the prisoners held by the Japanese, and perhaps a few thousand more. Militarily Bose's army cannot compare with the strength Britain would be able to muster in India. The Indian villager, whose average daily income is estimated at something under two cents, would eagerly accept the ten dollars a month which the British army would offer him. Bose and his Japanese mentors know that their chances for enlisting support in India diminish as the Allies' military power increases there.

The immediate purpose of Bose's army is in the main political. On the Indian side of the Indo-Burmese border lies Bengal, Bose's home and the seat of his political prestige. Bose will make every effort to incite Indians to riot, assassination, and sabotage behind our lines. Unquestionably he will try to smuggle them arms and equipment. Chaos among the civilian population along our lines of communication could seriously hamper, or perhaps even prevent, our projected offensive for the reopening of the Burma road.

But the United Nations have one secure political hold on the Indian people. Inevitably Bose has identified himself with the Axis, and particularly with Japan. He must refer constantly to "our Japanese friends," who equipped his army and who have "given this opportunity to the Indians to win freedom for India with a minimum of sacrifice." China's resistance to Japanese aggression, however, has been an inspiration to the Indian nation, and the mass of the people would be slow to assist China's enemy. Obviously Bose is deeply conscious of that fact. He claims that Chiang Kai-shek is fundamentally sympathetic to Japan but has bowed to the coercion of Britain

Septen

and Am
with the
ment, th
were toIt is
ties beco
China w
with Bos
conduce
the same
"Japan's
governed
in Canton
need havThe su
extent up
well-bein
reopen th
And if C
That is n
The senti
as the desIndia's
let, and th
only rival
silent. Th
that their
of the Ur
to prove i

Beh

THRE
West
people say
This was
Austrian
a speech by
is occasion
not the far
on such "r
the Augsb
August 21
about the w
for it. Wha
ing to gain
the war last
was followeTwo Sw
many which
the Basel
just back fr

and America. Chiang has been in India and has talked with the Indian people. He is well liked. Bose's argument, therefore, would prove effective only if Chiang were to cease his resistance.

It is in that perspective that the danger of Bose's activities becomes clear. It is apparent that the Japanese believe China will fall, perhaps within a year. Simultaneously with Bose's political offensive in India, the Japanese have conducted an "appeasement" campaign in China, offering the same kind of independence they granted to Burma. "Japan's sincerest hopes for China are for the self-governed development of China," says the Tokyo radio in Cantonese. "Japan is the one nation about which China need have no suspicion."

The success of this campaign will depend to a great extent upon further deterioration in China's physical well-being and in its relations with its allies. Failure to reopen the Burma road will reinforce Japan's efforts. And if China should fall, India would not be far behind. That is neither a far-fetched nor an alarmist statement. The sentiments of the Indian people are as little secret as the desperate condition of China.

India's nationalist aspirations now have but one outlet, and that one is working for the Axis. Nehru, Bose's only rival in political influence, is in jail and therefore silent. There is no equally powerful voice to tell Indians that their national interests are bound up with the cause of the United Nations, and there is no political activity to prove it to them.

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

THREE quotations, without comment: (1) The *Westfälische Landeszeitung* on August 14: "Some people say defeat wouldn't be as bad as it is painted." This was followed by curses on such people. (2) The Austrian newspaper *Heimabote* on August 21 published a speech by the Gauleiter in which he said: "The opinion is occasionally heard on remote farms that this war is not the farmer's business." This was followed by curses on such "remote" farmers. (3) A Bavarian newspaper, the *Augsburger Nationalzeitung*, editorialized thus on August 21: "Some stupid people say, 'What do I care about the war? I didn't want it. Let those fight who asked for it. What do I care—I have nothing to lose and nothing to gain.' We must admit realistically that the longer the war lasts the more people waver and weaken." This was followed by curses on these "stupid people."

Two Swiss newspapers contain descriptions of Germany which may serve as a warning to this country. In the Basel *Arbeiterzeitung* of August 18 a Swiss traveler just back from Germany reported:

As a result of the terrific shortage of goods black markets have sprung up which even the severest measures cannot restrict. Absurd prices are asked for goods that are in demand. For example, 150 to 300 marks [\$60 to \$80] for a pound of genuine coffee or tea; 200 to 400 marks [\$80 to \$160] for a pair of shoes, even for used ones; at Christmas and Easter 100 to 300 marks [\$40 to \$120] have been offered for fowl, and as much as 600 marks [\$240] has been paid for a goose. A quart of olive oil brings 150 marks [\$60], a bottle of wine 40 to 60 marks [\$16 to \$24]. People are not afraid of even the most enormous prices, for there is plenty of money but almost no way to spend it. That is why the black market has extended even to the lowest classes.

And the Berlin correspondent of the *Corriere del Ticino*, on August 10:

It is amazing to see the amount of money spent in Germany and the open-handed way in which it is spent. Every chance to buy something must be seized. People rarely ask the price, and the sums they pay are astounding to one who, coming from Switzerland, has not lost all sense of the value of money.

It must be noted that the strong desire to buy anything at any price is not limited to the wealthier classes. "The price doesn't matter" is a common expression, whether it is a question of theater tickets, cigarettes, liquor, clothes, rugs, or jewelry. . . . Such a tendency seems to be out of harmony with the unprecedented severity of the present war atmosphere. It can be explained only by the circumstances. There is hardly any possibility of converting the money people earn into real values. Consequently money has become superfluous and has lost its value.

In Germany cigarettes are now called "baby mattresses"—meaning that they are filled with something which, whatever it may be, is not tobacco. Even such cigarettes are greedily sought for—in vain. A Dortmund newspaper on July 31 described a scene in a railroad car. A "brute" had been "the victor in a terrible struggle for seats." He sprawled out on the seat, and put the finishing touch on his display of thoughtlessness by taking from his pocket "a package of twenty-five cigarettes, unmindful of the fact that in this province even a tobacco card with valid coupons is not sufficient to obtain cigarettes, which the majority of smokers must sadly give up for weeks."

The man who let his cigarettes be seen so openly, said the newspaper, was at best criminally tactless:

Whoever recklessly shows large packages of cigarettes or full cigarette cases in public must understand that the suspicion will arise that he has got them by crooked means—that he has "good connections" or at least that he has something to barter. This annoys those who have no time to rush from store to store, or to stand in line, and are unable to obtain anything even with coupons.

BOOKS and the ARTS

MARSDEN HARTLEY

BY PAUL ROSENFELD

THAT "gaunt eagle from the hills of Maine," the painter Marsden Hartley—who died September 2, in his sixty-seventh year—was a prodigy. He was an extraordinary, an almost gigantic secondary artist. Had Hartley possessed a passion for perfection, for round, full inclusivity in his work, and somewhat more of the spirit of consecutiveness, he might easily have become a major one. For he was abundantly talented, this very modern American.

He was a man who intensely admired style in art and life. And rapturous or tragic emotion, fresh visual experience, the sense of novelty in connection with old and familiar as well as curious and new objects, always to some degree were present in him. He was a ceaselessly inventive artist, too, arriving constantly at fanciful new relations and unifications of the qualities and shapes, textures and colors of objects—the qualities and textures of coarse no less than of precious ones, of rope and vegetables no less than of Victorian draperies, the clouds of the desert, the Mont Sainte-Victoire of the south of France. He was decidedly versatile besides: painting on glass as well as on canvas; drawing with silver-point as well as with oils; and was a fine poet and writer of prose, to boot. A poet indeed in all his media, exquisitely he grasped the proud music of things, the glintings of the ideal which never were entirely hidden from him.

At first, during the years immediately following the introduction of his work in 1909 at 291 Fifth Avenue, his strangely impressive pictures exhibited the influences now of Segantini, now of the pointillists, now of Ryder. Yet from the first the expression of a new personality was obvious—the tragic expression of a freeman and a pictorial stylist. Before 1914, in association with the *Blau Reiter* group—the Munich group of expressionists about Kandinsky and Marc—Hartley had developed an abstract prismatic idiom quite his own. And while he never entirely abandoned representation, and under the influence of a rediscovery of Cézanne in the later '20's fully went back to it, characteristically it was to a highly stylized, deliberately quaint, individual form of representation that he returned. The pity was that no idea, scene, or place ever was able lastingly to mobilize his soul and divert his persistent feeling of, for, and about himself and his artistic figure. Hartley at one period thought that Ryder had "fixed his imagination forever for him in the land of his birth." At another he fancied himself in the European tradition, and conceived the idea of continuing Cézanne's work. But his life really had no center outside himself.

For all Hartley's consequently frequent nonchalance of mood and flightiness in design and execution, no piece of work by him is bare of a peculiar elegance, while many a one is distinguished to a remarkable degree. Gracefulness and taste were deeply of the man's essence. We perceive this through his paintings' witness of his tactful sense of the

pictorial medium's limitation. His pictures never rival sculpture. Hartley, indeed, was among the first Americans to seize the lesson of Cézanne and the later Renoir: the lesson that the painter is preconfined to the decoration of flat surfaces, merely may suggest the third dimension through subtleties of pigment but need not seek to deceive the eye. We see Hartley's tastefulness elsewhere; at well-nigh every point; even in his most spectacularly flaunting canvases. Feelings of supereminence unfortunately were not uncommon in him. They were responsible for his predilection for grandiose rhythms and "stunning" or overwhelming symbols such as the plumage of the male bird, the masses of mountains and of mountainous surf. Well: some dandified twist of form, cool shapeliness of curve and elegance in color, keeps even the most parade-like of these almost diabolical expressions of his safely this side vulgarity and pompousness. Throughout, besides, one perceives that though he never was a warm colorist, Hartley possessed an unusual gift for refined and piquant pigmentation; an ability to extract dusky richness from dark and bitter tones; an unfailing awareness of the interest of handsome decoration.

Maine of all his haunts most consistently compelled his feeling and humanized his mood. Probably for that reason he returned to it so often in his final years. Contact with his natal soil doubtless also facilitated the expression of his lifelong and mystical sense of death. Certainly, the units of the early dark series of "Deserted Farms" from Maine—well-nigh Wagnerian depictions of solitude, starvation, and New England's tragic sterility—rank high among his powerful if not his most accomplished paintings. So, too, do certain of his later, more accomplished visions of northern rock-and-stump-strewn pastures, and the "Dead Seagull," that noble companion of Ryder's piteously dead "Canary." Still it would be folly to identify his art's importance with the portion of it concerning Maine. Hartley's range in theme was vast. His output was enormous; during every period of his mercurial career he lavished intense and sumptuous paintings on the world; and a body of work more uniquely varied than his, and more fanciful, striking, and pungent, will not survive many of his American contemporaries in any of the fields of art.

Men and History

THE HERO IN HISTORY: A STUDY IN LIMITATION AND POSSIBILITY. By Sidney Hook. The John Day Company. \$2.50.

THOUGH it is short, this latest work of Sidney Hook is easily the richest and fullest of his historico-philosophical studies. It deals with the related questions, What is history, do we make it, and what share in the making can we assign to the outstanding individual popularly known as "the hero"?

Mr. Hook begins by describing and refuting the two tradi-

Septen
tional h
alone sh
abstract
history
flowing
In the
displays
disentan
absurd, c
and pres
been luci
his freer
a certain
Through
has long
take it up
shortest r
you to R
Caesar's c
Set the h
roots ther
possibilit
these poss
sense of j
most deli
tion of Oc
of events.
of history,
ment or di
Mr. Hook
cal elemen
But wha
making m
(whose im
that saved
they"), the
leadership
Without hi
come. With
existing inc
results due
tions, but w
elty. He is
in any intell
sum total o
his own wil
the upshot o
no more ab
about any o
the assertion
runs here in
compels us
to the medie
cause which
—which ma
Mr. Hook
simple com
includes sor
is designed
by the mode

tional hypotheses which state respectively that great men alone shape the history of nations and, contrariwise, that abstract or general forces, spiritual or material, determine history, using men simply as figureheads, carried on the flowing tide like surf riders, to their inescapable destination.

In the course of combating these two absolutisms Mr. Hook displays his usual dialectical skill. He frames alternatives, disentangles overlapping assumptions, reduces them to the absurd, or cites concrete examples selected with great care and presented with even greater skill. His prose has always been lucid and sharp; it is now warmer and mellower through his freer use of images and metaphors and the conversion of a certain bitter humor into good-natured amusement. Throughout, the author dominates his material as one who has long since gathered and ordered it and who can now take it up from any side and reach his center of vision by the shortest route. Mention casually Cleopatra's nose and he leads you to Roman history and the inadequacy of explaining Caesar's or Antony's policy by the Egyptian queen's beauty. Set the hounds of economic determinism on his trail and he routs them with a wonderfully condensed account of the possibilities of Presidential action in the United States as these possibilities existed in 1929 and 1933. But perhaps his sense of personality as revealed in and by history is at its most delicate in the masterly chapter on the Russian Revolution of October, 1917, defining the role of Lenin as a maker of events. Those forty pages should be read by every student of history, lay and professional, for regardless of one's agreement or disagreement with its conclusion—which exemplifies Mr. Hook's hypothesis—the essay is a model of the methodical element in historical thinking.

But what is the Hook hypothesis? It is that the event-making man, as distinguished from the "eventful man" (whose importance is that ascribed by Hobbes to the geese that saved the Roman Capitol—"because they were there, not they"), the event-making man is by virtue of his qualities of leadership a factor in the outcome of mighty movements. Without him, there was a real possibility of a different outcome. With him, there is not only the carrying out of wishes existing inchoate in the minds of many but the addition of results due to his will alone. True, he works within limitations, but within them he has real power to create real novelty. He is not the "product" of a particular age or evolution in any intelligible sense; for if he is considered simply as the sum total of preexisting ideas and wills we are forgetting his own will and unique abilities; and if he is considered as the upshot of six thousand years of recorded history, we know no more about him than we did before, or than we know about any of his undistinguished contemporaries, of whom the assertion is equally true. The assigning of causes in history runs here into the usual snag of too much or too little, and compels us either to salvage the four types of causes known to the medieval logicians or to abandon the single "efficient" cause which modern science has selected for its own purposes—which may not be those of historiography.

Mr. Hook does not go so far as this; he takes cause in a simple common-sense fashion, and his speculation, which includes some excellent and truly hypothetical "if history," is designed by him to furnish wisdom for present application by the modern citizen of a democracy. Is the hero compatible

with the continuance of government based on freely given consent? The author hedges about his assent with strict conditions: a democracy must always be suspicious of the typical heroic qualities; it must keep ever in mind what a hero can and cannot do with social, political, and economic forces; and it must insist on a periodic review of the hero's doings, even while it recognizes their value in times of stress when swiftness of thought and action are indispensable. In other words, Mr. Hook preaches the wisdom of the Roman Republic with its "dictators" accountable to the Senate and, like the most famous of them, returnable to the plow. It is interesting to recall that with this symbol in mind the soldiers of the American Revolution formed the Society of the Cincinnati.

I should give unqualified approval to Mr. Hook's view of history if certain features of it—congenial to his mind and uncongenial to mine—did not stand in the way. They are matters of atmosphere and thus not without importance. For example, I admire his clarity, but I wonder whether for the sake of it he did not make one unjustified simplification. I mean his deciding the problem of democracy with sole reference to what might be called the top hero. He does say the democratic ideal should be to encourage leadership throughout the nation, but he repeats that heroic qualities should be viewed "with suspicion"; and he neglects to point out the necessity of heroic action in the doing of every normal day's work. If we are suspicious, we may overlook the function of the hero as the binding, organizing element in social life—the central nervous system for limbs endowed with merely muscular energy. It can be historically argued that lack of direction in the varied tasks of a society is one of the strongest urges to seeking an over-all hero who will magically supply the line of march. Being no less than Mr. Hook a pluralist, I am especially sensitive to the need for diversified centers of light and leading; for the breakdown of organic pluralism is a monistic block: you pass from the fruit growing on the branch to the rectangular brick of frozen pulp without shape or savor.

Then, again for simplicity, Mr. Hook excludes from action on the course of history genius in art, philosophy, or science, excepting of course those scientists whose work has been translated into technological change. At a later place in the book a single sentence modifies this exclusion but, to my mind, not enough; for the "forces" of history are composed of individual wills, each of which is directly or indirectly affected by ideas and art. Patriotism is such a "force," but its contents include poetry and song, great ideas and bad chromos. There need be no understanding of art as aesthetic objects; it is enough that there be associations of pride and attachment. The name of Shakespeare, who has always been much less read than praised, is as effective as the actual contents of Homer, who was learned by heart in ancient Greece: both derive their power from aesthetic greatness filtering through conscious critics and teachers of the young.

My last objection is to Mr. Hook's fondness for the label "scientific" for his work and that of other historians. With the best will in the world I cannot find that he means more by it than history based on honest and sound judgment, and especially free from the preconceptions of a rigid thesis. I should not dream of quarreling with the word, or with the

"SHOULD NEGROES SIT AT THE PEACE TABLE?"

A Significant Symposium On The Post-War
Status Of Our Largest Minority

Read What These Authorities On
Government Say In

THE CHICAGO DEFENDER

"For 38 Years A Leading Negro Weekly"

W. E. B. DuBois
John Temple Graves
J. F. Stone
Howard Vincent O'Brien
Stanley High
Harold J. Laski
Archibald MacLeish
Dr. Mercer Cook
Prof. Earl Johnson
Prof. Maynard Krueger
Prof. Avery Craven

Mark Ethridge
Dr. Charles Wesley
Margaret Anderson
Dr. Ernest Angell
Dr. Louis Wirth
Pearl Buck
Drew Pearson
Samuel Grafton
Dr. F. D. Patterson
Col. Robert R. McCormick
Milton Mayer

BEGINNING OCTOBER 2

And Each Week Thereafter To December 18
10c Per Copy\$1.20 for 12 Issues

THE CHICAGO DEFENDER
3435 INDIANA AVE.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

After Fascism What? A Mass Meeting FOR A FREE ITALY

Speakers:

COUNT CARLO SFORZA

Former Italian Foreign Minister and Ambassador
to France

LEON HENDERSON

Former Administrator OPA, Director Board of Editors,
Research Institute of America.

DR. REINHOLD NIEBUHR

National Chairman, Union for Democratic Action

JAMES BATTISTONI

National President, Mazzini Society

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1943 - 8 P. M.

CARNEGIE HALL, 7th Avenue and 57th Street, New York City

TICKETS: (including tax)

First tier boxes \$27.50 (8 seats), Parquet \$1.10, Second
tier boxes 94c, Dress circle 83c, Balcony (unreserved) 55c

Auspices: Mazzini Society and Union for Democratic Action
Tickets available at New York U.D.A. Office, 9 East 46th Street, PLaza 8-0700;
Mazzini Society, 1775 Broadway (67th Street), Circle 5-4309;
La Parola, 80 East 11th Street, STUYVESANT 9-8813.
Carnegie Hall Box Office.

references to the highly acceptable historical "laws" that he is careful to enunciate with quotation marks around "laws," if I did not believe that his striving after science led him to consider with too much seriousness and sympathy ideas like those of F. A. Wood, who apparently tried to reach "empirical results" by giving "strong" and "weak" kings plus and minus marks and "correlating" their "strength" or "weakness" with the qualities or defects of their periods. His work yielded a number, though it really amounted to zero. Mr. Hook ably criticizes the method and the results both, but he is evidently attracted by the *idea* of the method, which is to me the negation of the historical sense.

More deplorable still, as I think, is the fact that having "empiricism" and "science" as watchwords, Mr. Hook is hampered in his reading of works such as Carlyle's "Heroes and the Heroic in History" and James's "Great Men and Their Environment." His literalism makes him put these two contributions to his own problem farther away than they should be from his own solution; and one could say the same of his detailed refutation of Pascal's famous remark about Cleopatra's nose. Pascal was not interested in the particular illustration; doubtless he knew less than Mr. Hook about Roman history; but he was saying briefly and allusively a part of what Mr. Hook has told us brilliantly and with the utmost degree of usefulness attainable by history and philosophy combined.

JACQUES BARZUN

Journals of the War

MEDITERRANEAN ASSIGNMENT. By Richard McMillan. Doubleday, Doran and Company. \$3.

G. I. JUNGLE: AN AMERICAN SOLDIER IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW GUINEA. By E. J. Kahn, Jr. Simon and Schuster. \$2.

OUT IN THE BOONDOCKS: MARINES IN ACTION IN THE PACIFIC. By James D. Horan and Gerold Frank. G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$2.75.

THE newspaper correspondents in Cairo had been accustomed to British generals whose thinking, if any, was in terms of defense—how to stop the Germans from conquering Egypt. The result was that the Eighth Army, a year ago, had been all but destroyed, and Rommel's *Afrika Korps* was at the gates of Alexandria. Then General Montgomery came to the desert in August. He found British soldiers digging defensive ditches behind the Alamein line. "Stop it," he ordered. "You'll never need them." Two months later, on the morning of October 23, Montgomery called the correspondents into his tent and told them in a matter-of-fact way that Rommel would be knocked out of Africa in a battle beginning that night. "We correspondents turned and looked at one another questioningly," says Richard McMillan. "We had never come across this type of unorthodox general before." They thought he was either a great general or a madman.

Mr. McMillan was a correspondent for the United Press. He went to the front in Albania when the Greeks were fighting the Italians, then returned to Greece with the pitifully small British Expeditionary Force and saw it being whipped by the Germans. All this is in "Mediterranean Assignment,"

which is the book, desert can of Tobruk under the madman In putt Millan con of the fall shocked th usly Tob German b cost the Br When the would not fore, the d and retire Ab the polo-pl decision an The British of guns, ta The Eigh around the soldiers in the same v Americans who had w induction in appeared in eyes takes volutely amu revealing co virtually no "Out in More blood so far. Mr. men of the wrote their themselves colloquialism The effect is Nearly all stories were out of the ba had a little h mtery by a f ansils. A sni Torgerson an ounded in t ad stole his veteran mar do if a gre because yo ing. A smol ew it, and battlefield fo and himse to strangle h This book

which is a rather conglomerate journalistic history. Most of the book, and the best parts of it, deals with the North African desert campaigns: the first advance under Wavell, the siege of Tobruk, the stand at El Alamein, and the final triumph under the military leader who was either a great general or a madman.

In putting together the story of the desert war Mr. McMillan contributes much that is new, notably in his account of the fall of Tobruk in June of last year—a disaster which shocked the British public almost as much as Dunkirk. Previously Tobruk had held out for eighteen months against German besiegers, but the feat of keeping it supplied had cost the British a ship a week in warships and merchantmen. When the question of a second siege arose, the navy said it could not guarantee to repeat the costly performance. Therefore, the desert commanders decided to abandon the fortress and retire with their army and supplies intact to the Egyptian border. About two days before the German attack, however, the polo-playing strategists of G. H. Q. in Cairo reversed the decision and ordered that Tobruk be held. It was too late. The British lost the fortress, 26,000 men, and huge quantities of guns, tanks, and stores.

The Eighth Army's subsequent victory at El Alamein went around the world by radio and lifted the spirits of American soldiers in the jungles of New Guinea, who were fighting the same war in a wholly different milieu. One of those Americans was E. J. Kahn, Jr., a Harvard graduate of 1937 who had worked on the staff of the *New Yorker* until his induction into the army. Most of his book, "G. I. Jungle," appeared in that magazine originally; so the war through his eyes takes on a distinctly *New Yorkerish* flavor. He is politely amused by the quaint customs of Australia and the revealing costumes of the New Guinea natives. There is virtually no bloodshed.

"Out in the Boondocks" goes to the opposite extreme. More blood is shed per paragraph than in any other war book so far. Mr. Horan and Mr. Frank interviewed twenty-one men of the Marine Corps who fought on Guadalcanal, and wrote their stories in the first person as though the marines themselves were telling them. The authors preserved the colloquialisms, the grammatical errors, and the cuss words. The effect is realistic, to say the least.

Nearly all of the twenty-one marines who thus tell their stories were wounded or shell-shocked. Sergeant Koziar came out of the battle with a little hole in the left side of his neck and a little hole in the right side; the bullet had missed an artery by a fraction of an inch and had removed both his ossils. A sniper's bullet skimmed along the wrist of Captain Forgeron and removed the works of his watch. Private Hall, wounded in the chest, played dead while Japanese kicked him and stole his cartridge belt. First Sergeant Harry D'Ortona, a veteran marine, had instructed countless new recruits what to do if a grenade landed beside them: pick it up and throw it, because you get away from it faster that way than by running. A smoking grenade landed at his feet, exploded as he threw it, and peppered him with shrapnel; he lay on the battlefield forty-eight hours, and survived. Private Harding found himself lying in a foxhole with a Japanese, and had to strangle him by hand.

This book is solely concerned with blood and death in

Lippincott LEADERS!

WAR DISCOVERS ALASKA

by Joseph Driscoll

Here is the first revealing book about the strategic American front right in our own backyard. "An admirable compendium of past and present . . . should occupy a secure place in the literature about Alaska."—Ernest Gruening, Governor of Alaska, in *The Saturday Review of Literature*. Illustrated. 4th Printing. \$3.00

THE SILENT WAR

by Jon B. Jansen and Stefan Weyl

Out of Nazi Germany comes this authentic report of the underground movement which is giving the Gestapo the jitters. "A book which should be read widely. It is the story of heroes about heroes. It gives proof that liberty and freedom are not mere slogans but ideas for which thousands of men all over the world are laying down their lives."—*Saturday Review of Literature*. 2nd Printing. \$2.50

ROUND TRIP TO RUSSIA

by Walter Graebner

The first eye-witness report by a war correspondent of the historic events in Russia during the crucial autumn of 1942. "This book explains more neatly and succinctly than any other book I have read (or written) the why and how of Soviet Russia and why and how the Russians are fighting so bravely."—Walter Duranty, *N. Y. Times Book Review*. Illustrated. 3rd Printing. \$3.00

YEAR OF THE WILD BOAR

An American Woman in Japan

by Helen Mears

"An excellent book about the Japanese way of life, customs, culture and civilization."—*N. Y. Times*. "On the required reading list of those who realize that an enemy only half understood is an enemy half victorious."—Clifton Fadiman, *The New Yorker*. 5th Printing. \$2.75

OUR AGE OF UNREASON

by Franz Alexander, M.D.

"You are here notified that you had better read *Our Age of Unreason* . . . it discusses the hope of peace on the only plane where it can be realistic—whatever books you may be consulting, you had better put them aside until you have mastered Dr. Alexander's."—Bernard DeVoto, *Harper's Magazine*. 3rd Printing. \$3.00

HOW TO WIN THE PEACE

by C. J. Hambro

President of the League of Nations Assembly

A warning of Germany's creed of the Master-Race, coupled with a practical plan that is "a great contribution to the discussions of the future peace."—Eduard L. Benes, *President of the Czechoslovak Republic*. 4th Printing. \$3.00

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
Philadelphia New York

the battle climaxes on Guadalcanal. Of course there is much more to war than that, but nothing more important to the men in the front lines. It is all very well to read war books that emphasize the glamor, the adventure, the fascination of strategy and high politics; here in these pages one gets right out where the bullets are flying. It is not pleasant reading, but perhaps it is wholesome.

MARCUS DUFFIELD

The "Tribune": First Phase

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE: ITS FIRST HUNDRED YEARS. Volume I, 1847-1865. By Philip Kinsley. Alfred A. Knopf. \$5.

THE *Chicago Tribune* will celebrate its hundredth anniversary in 1947. The present volume is the first of a series of what its author terms "historical sketches" of that newspaper, each of which will cover a period of years and which are scheduled for completion by the centennial year. Mr. Kinsley has been a top-flight *Tribune* correspondent for a long time. He writes clearly and for the most part well, and to that extent his book is a contribution to newspaper history. He lacks, however, the sense of a historical perspective. Apparently he has turned the pages of the *Tribune* and gleaned material for a running narrative, padding out his information with quotations from secondary sources which rarely shed further light on his subject. Chicago, which gave the *Tribune* its field for growth, is little more than a name throughout the volume. The news items, culled from issues of the *Tribune*, have a consistent air of irrelevance.

The essence of the old *Tribune* was its Republicanism. This volume, in its most important section, tells how Joseph Medill, the guiding spirit of the newspaper, and his associates contributed to making Lincoln Presidential timber. The *Tribune's* services during the Civil War were not unique. Like other Northern journals it thought the war would be short, approved McClellan and then abandoned him, demanded emancipation before the President was ready to proclaim it, and developed the general characteristics of "Radical Republicanism." But as a fugleman for Lincoln, the *Tribune* was far in advance of other and more distinguished Republican journals.

Medill, who was one of the founders of the Republican Party, did not come to the *Tribune* until 1855. He became acquainted with Lincoln that same year. From then on the newspaper printed Lincoln's speeches, familiarized its readers with his personality, and supported him against Douglas. But it was Medill's acute understanding of Lincoln's "availability" which finally determined his support of Lincoln for President rather than of the more radical Chase or Seward.

The President is said to have remarked, after his election, "Well, gentlemen, where do I come in? You seem to have given everything away." Time and again the *Tribune* affirmed its complete disinterestedness in his success; but Lincoln, when the issue of patronage came up, was forced to take into account the political deals which Medill and his coworkers had made. To say that the men who edited the *Tribune* were first and foremost business men not only describes them; it furnishes a key to the evolution of their newspaper.

LOUIS FILLER

Fiction in Review

A MAD, bad, and dangerous book, Allan Seager's "Equinox" (Simon and Schuster, \$2.75) is fiction's most recent attempt to practice psychiatry without a license. Received as a conscientious study in incest, actually it develops from a not unpromising idea—and a very good first chapter—into what is little more than a penny thriller in morbid psychology, essentially on the intellectual level of a Karloff or Lorre movie. As a matter of fact, Mr. Seager's Verplanck—he is the psychiatric detonator, who makes the incest explode—is more than half our old friend the Mad Scientist of the comics and Hollywood. His lineage can also be traced back through Spandrell of "Point Counter Point" to des Esseintes of Huysmans's "A Rebours": start experimenting for experiment's sake and you seem to end up with a man-eating shark; and at least from the historical point of view there is a nice significance in Verplanck's concern with food, drink, and the appointments of his home.

It's a father and daughter in Mr. Seager's Oedipus situation—a young middle-aged newspaperman comes home from Europe on the eve of war and sets up house with his seventeen-year-old daughter. For the father this new home is a protection from the world; for the girl, fresh from a convent school, it is a romantic ideal of domestic love. But along come malicious friends who mouth the ugly word "sex," and father runs to Verplanck for advice and help. This is the moment Mr. Seager has been waiting for; indeed, throughout the book, you have the sense of the author lying in wait for his characters: it is a novel disconcertingly without feeling. Verplanck is an amateur psychiatrist who devotes his life to destroying people by means of his "scientific" understanding of them; he keeps elaborate case records on his friends; he marries a woman in order to give her a neurosis which he will then be able to follow from scratch—all very serious and sinister and fantastic. Well, Verplanck too says sex, with the full weight of his psychiatric authority, and the girl commits suicide.

I call "Equinox" not only mad and bad but dangerous—and I mean this quite simply and literally. The danger lies, obviously, in the representation of Verplanck's scientific authority. Mr. Seager is careful to call him an amateur, but Verplanck is also an M.D. and has been psychoanalyzed; his analyst is even mentioned by actual name, Stekel. Also, psychiatry as practiced by Verplanck is at no point contrasted to the ethical practice of psychiatry. Psychiatry being, to the popular imagination, the most suspect of the sciences, this propagation in fiction of one author's own dark fancies is socially irresponsible.

Two years ago Robert Paul Smith published his first novel, "So It Doesn't Whistle." Now his second novel, "The Journey" (Holt, \$2), has appeared, and like its predecessor it is full of mis- or undirected talent, and cleverness in a vacuum. The story of a young man named Paul Marrane who throws up his job in an advertising agency to seek his soul in Mexico, "The Journey" is not the kind of finished job, like "Equinox," to dismiss or disdain, but a novel to make one sternly pedagogic with its author. For Mr. Smith is still quite a young man, and he has been praised for the wrong things in his earlier work: for instance, his brittle modernity is something

to be guar
his real a
his major
lence in l
last and n
impressi
working a
he should

The aut
although t
and until
theme for
self-exhibi
stature and
the arts co
artist nor
talk; he is
jazz, just a
half in po
one's cultu
material fo
If the wor
as the rea
making cl
importance

Again, r
vation. He
drinks too
pointed ou
the dead-e
are Mr. Sm
writer has
provided, c
for the writ
is to see th

Finally,
person wh
Stripped o
mains from
and althou
not be eno
taking-off p
doesn't tru
ance the en
necessities

RIC
EA
MUR
ANGE
Book & Lyrics
BROADHU

Buy Yo

At the re
in which
offers to c
lisher's pri
the order,

The Natio

to be guarded against, not fostered, and on the other hand his real ability lies in his power to see and describe; then, his major faults are the faults of his generation, their prevalence in large part the responsibility of the book reviewers; last and not least in importance, Mr. Smith's seriousness, the impression he makes of being committed to writing and working at it, demands an equal seriousness from his critics: he should not be patronized with easy praise.

The author of "The Journey," then, should be told that although the theme of the artist in search of his soul is still, and until the day of the corporate man always will be, a fine theme for fiction, it is a theme that lends itself merely to self-exhibition unless the artist-hero is shown as a person of stature and his soul as worth saving. Paul Marrane talks about the arts constantly, but this makes him neither a convincing artist nor an interesting human being. His talk is "wise" talk; he is in on painting, Mozart, García Lorca, and hot jazz, just as he is in on sex. But looked at seriously, this being half in possession of, instead of being possessed by, either one's culture or one's body is a stage of development or material for satire: it is not desirable by mature standards. If the world is full of random knowingness passing itself off as the real thing, the author who writes about it without making clear his own maturity inevitably reduces his own importance.

Again, nothing much happens to Paul on his voyage of salvation. He drives his car fast, he sleeps with a waitress, he drinks too much, he talks with a steward. But it should be pointed out to Mr. Smith that this refusal to tell a story is the dead-end of fiction. Joyce, Proust, Hemingway, whoever are Mr. Smith's models, all were careful to tell a story. If a writer has nothing to say except what he feels, he is a poet—provided, of course, that he feels with poetic intensity—but for the writer of fiction to look at the world without its drama is to see the world peopled only by himself.

Finally, Paul Marrane, or his author, turns out to be a nice person who went to Mexico and enjoyed what he saw. Stripped of its literary lardings, in other words, what remains from "The Journey," and its best part, is a travel diary, and although the ability to see and record what you see may not be enough to make a novelist, it is a far sounder literary taking-off place than the desire to make literature. Mr. Smith doesn't trust this talent; he fancies it up, giving to performance the energies that might better be devoted to such modest necessities of fiction as character and plot.

DIANA TRILLING

Whether you believe in this:

*A post-war world organization.
Liberal capitalistic democracy.
Fuller cooperation with Russia.
Complete racial equality.*

Or this:

*There'll always be wars.
You can't change human nature.
Power politics are here to stay.
You can't feed every Hottentot.*

You must understand

THE DYNAMIC CONCEPT

which has provoked a raging controversy

The CENTURY of the COMMON MAN

Now, when victory and plans for the peace are a vital issue, Henry A. Wallace's ideas are the concern of all intelligent people. They're bound to influence the shape of things to come, just as his electrifying speeches have guided the thoughts of millions. What can we learn from Russia? How shall we handle the national debt? What kind of post-war world organization shall we have? How can we achieve freedom from want? This book, a collection of the most significant recent Wallace statements, discusses these and other pressing problems, giving the straight answers of a public man who is not afraid to speak his mind.

Paper-bound 75c. Cloth 1.50

"They constitute a remarkable collection. It seems safe to say that no other Vice President, in so short a space of time, ever said so much that mattered."

—N. Y. TIMES.

*Inquire of publisher
for special discounts
on quantity orders.*



Henry A. WALLACE

Reynal & Hitchcock

"BREEZY NEW MUSICAL HIT"—Walter Winchell
RICHARD KOLLMAR Presents A NEW MUSICAL COMEDY
EARLY TO BED
MURIEL RICHARD MARY BOB
ANGELUS KOLLMAR SMALL HOWARD
Book & Lyrics by GEORGE MARION, Jr. • Music by THOMAS (PAT) WALLER
BROADHURST Theatre, 44th St. W. of B'way—Air Conditioned
Evgs., 8:30. Matinee Wed. & Sat., 2:40

Buy Your Books Through The Nation

At the request of many readers who reside in communities in which no bookshop has been established, *The Nation* offers to deliver any book to your door at the regular publisher's price (post free) provided payment is received with the order, or publisher's price plus postage if sent C. O. D.

Readers' Service Division

The Nation • 55 Fifth Avenue • New York

IN BRIEF

CLIMATES OF TRAGEDY. By William Van O'Connor. Louisiana State University Press. \$1.75.

This is a compact, scholarly, and thoughtful study of the essence of tragedy. Compared with the tragedy of the great age of Greece and with Shakespeare, the tragedy of our own stage is seen as falling short of the true standard. Briefly, an event is not tragic simply because it is terrible or causes suffering. It is tragic in the poetic sense only if it befalls the principal character as a consequence of his own evil-doing, and if he behaves with dignity under misfortune. The man who redeems himself by dying is not a tragic figure.

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. Edited with an Introduction by Joseph R. Strayer. Princeton University Press. \$2.50.

In this stimulating short volume the significance and value of history are discussed from various aspects by several first-class students of the subject. Jacques Barzun, on History, Popular and Unpopular, is perhaps the most entertaining, but all are readable and thought-provoking—Hajo Holborn on The Science of History; Herbert Heaton's warning against a one-sided interpretation, The Economic Impact on History; Biography and History, by Dumas Malone; and George La Piana on the danger of approaching history with preconceived beliefs, Theology and History.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE RISE OF THE MODERN NAVY.

By Gordon Carpenter O'Gara. Princeton University Press. \$1.50.

One of our greatest national blind spots has been neglect of the study of war. It is therefore much to the credit of Princeton University that its scholars have taken the lead in producing a series of excellent volumes based on exhaustive research in military and naval affairs. While less ambitious than some of its predecessors, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy" is a worthy member of a series which includes works by Professor Brodie and the Sprouts. In bringing Theodore Roosevelt to the helm of affairs in the early 1900's fate assigned him one of the most revolutionary eras in naval history. With significant changes of every sort impending, Roosevelt found the American navy guilty of sins of com-

mission and omission of every kind and so deeply mired in conservatism that it had no idea of its own backwardness. How unsatisfactory conditions in organization, ship construction, target practice, tactics, fundamental strategy, and advancement of officers were improved is the main theme of Mr. O'Gara's book. Despite occasional failures the results were impressive, and the President is revealed as a military statesman of the first rank. While this volume contains little new material, it is nevertheless a well-written study of an important period in our naval history.

THE ANATOMY OF NONSENSE. By Yvor Winters. New Directions. \$3.

Mr. Yvor Winters, as he states with pride, is reactionary. He also starts from premises so far removed from those of most educated moderns that his scale of values can be called esoteric. But he is a learned man and an interesting writer, and one can be grateful for his brilliant exposure of the confusion of Henry Adams and T. S. Eliot; the latter is one of the most confused minds and baffling critics now adorning literature. In the other two essays in this book—on Wallace Stevens and John Crowe Ransom—Mr. Winters illustrates his own faults, which are, indeed, fundamental.

THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AMERICA. An Introductory Survey With Special Reference to Peru. By J. F. Normano and Antonello Gerbi. The John Day Company. \$1.75.

This brief handbook, issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Latin American Economic Institute, makes readily accessible the basic facts that are prerequisite to a discussion of the significance of the striking Japanese infiltration into some countries of South America. Its statements are well documented.

NEW POEMS. Dylan Thomas. New Directions. \$1.

Dylan Thomas is a young English poet whose work produced excited cries from young American poets when "The World I Breathe" was published here about three years ago. Sixteen poems he has written since have now been issued by New Directions under the title "New Poems." It is doubtful whether the original excitement that Thomas created will be revived by these further examples of his work. The jacket states modestly that in these poems Thomas "seems to be

progressing toward greater logical lucidity"; that may be so, but most readers will still find him more or less opaque. The longest poem in the little volume is the Ballad of the Long-Legged Bait, an alliterative piece which, astonishingly enough for the work of a member of the avant-garde of English letters, stems straight from Swinburne. As might be suspected, it does not come off quite so well as the ballads of Mr. S.

THE MIDDLE EAST. By Eliahu Ben-Horin. W. W. Norton and Company. \$3.

A lucid description of the breakdown of the Turkish Empire leads into an unusually good survey of Middle Eastern political problems. A Zionist, inclining toward Max Nordau's intransigence rather than toward Dr. Weizmann's "reasonableness," the author presents a critical but not intransigent account not only of British misconduct in Palestine but of European imperialism in general. Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism receive thorough examination and are discounted as dangers. Liberals who are sympathetic to Zionism but naturally suspicious of enforced migration—such as the author proposes for the Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan—might have liked a more inclusive survey of Zionist views concerning the problems of settlement. With this and the added reservation that greater attention might have been paid to economic matters Mr. Ben-Horin's lively book deserves recommendation as a primer of Near Eastern problems.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIA. By R. Palme Dutt. International Publishers. \$2.

To the non-Communist advocate of Indian freedom the chief value of this book will lie in its excellent historical analyses. These are Marxist in method, but even to the reader who rejects the author's philosophy the material presented, not easily to be found elsewhere, will be of real value. The rapid survey of economic conditions, the account of the origin of private property in land—not an indigenous feature of Indian life—and the agrarian crisis, the outline of the structure of Indian society, and the critique of British imperialism are all of them good and some of them more than good. Less reliable, though always suggestive, are the sections on the Indian national movement and the role of Congress. To the average liberal reader the author's criticism of the Congress resolution on non-cooperation, agreeably

MUSIC

IT IS not true that when a member of a symphony orchestra participates in a performance which is recorded he is making a substitute for his services that will make them superfluous. It is not true that records—whether played in the home or from a broadcasting studio—have reduced the number of symphony orchestras or their concerts. On the contrary, not only has recording put money into the pocket of the symphony orchestra player, but royalties from the records have helped the orchestras to make up their deficits, and there is reason to believe that the records have helped to create an interest in the music which has led people to the concert hall and opera house. So with the player in a celebrated jazz band: when he participates in a performance that is recorded he is not throwing himself out of work; on the contrary, the records he makes—played in the home and in juke-boxes—contribute enormously to building up the popularity of his band that means engagements for living performances and for recording.

What is true is that by making records the symphony orchestra or jazz band musician has contributed to throwing somebody else out of work. Some of the small broadcasting stations which now broadcast records of great symphony orchestras and name bands, some of the restaurants which use Muzak, some of the large dance places which use multi-speakered juke-boxes formerly employed small groups of living musicians; and these men have lost their jobs. The technological unemployment that Mr. Petrillo complains of is, then, a fact.

If it is a fact he is right in contending that something should be done about it; and one of the things he wants is re-employment. Now obviously if the small broadcasting stations were compelled to stop broadcasting records of symphony orchestras and name bands they would not engage living symphony orchestras and name bands. The most that some of them could hire is a few players; and some could not afford even that. Again, some of the restaurants and dance places which use Muzak and juke-boxes could hire the small groups they employed formerly; but smaller places like diners

and lunchrooms and ice cream parlors, if deprived of juke-boxes, would go back to no music at all. In this connection one must consider, however, that the public which has been hearing Beethoven played by great symphony orchestras or has been dancing to popular songs played by name bands may not want to listen to Liszt's "Liebestraum" played by a five-man group or dance to popular songs played by local jazz bands; so that even if Mr. Petrillo is able to compel the reemployment of a number of living musicians, some of them may be hired merely to "stand by" without playing—which is as degrading and vicious when done by musicians as it is when done by workers in other unions.

Reemployment can take care of only part of the technologically unemployed; and for the rest Mr. Petrillo asked the industry for financial compensation. The industry's spokesmen answered with objections to his estimate of the musicians thrown out of work, to the amount of compensation he had asked, to the method by which the money he had demanded would be controlled and administered; and some of the objections seemed justified. But the interesting thing is that the industry's spokesmen did not make any proposal for a joint inquiry for the purpose of discovering how much unemployment had resulted from the use of records and deciding what should be done about it—as they would have done if they had had any feeling of social responsibility. This is interesting because they accused Mr. Petrillo of ruthless disregard of the public interest, when they themselves did not have the regard for the public interest that would have led them to recognize an obligation on the part of their industry to do something about the technological unemployment it had caused.

Sir Thomas Beecham's suggestion that the compensation come out of fees paid for the use of the records is better than Mr. Petrillo's remedies in all ways—one of them being the fact that the basis of the compensation is not an obligation depending on corporation executives' feeling of social responsibility, but the much stronger legal obligation to pay for what one uses. The companies which take advantage of the present defect in the copyright law to pirate recorded performance should be compelled by a correction of the defect to pay for their use of the records; when they have paid there will be additional money in the hands of the musicians who made the records that have thrown other musicians out of work; and some

of this money will go, as it should, to compensate these others.

Another advantage of Sir Thomas's remedy is that it is not related to the condition it would remedy. When the industry was asked to pay compensation for the technological unemployment it had caused, it had a right to raise questions about the men who were to be compensated, and to object to giving the union complete control of the money. But the industry cannot refuse to pay for its use of records on the ground that afterwards the money will be controlled by the union and may be given to members of the union who really are not entitled to it. What becomes of the money the musicians will receive for the use of the records will be none of the industry's business, and will not affect its obligation to pay the money for the use; if the union mishandles the money, that—like other intra-union abuses—will be for the membership of the union to deal with. And if the industry expresses concern over such possible mishandling, that will be a smoke-screen to cover its real objective, which will be to continue not to pay for what it uses; just as its loud concern over the abuse of the composer by ASCAP, with which it justified the setting-up of its own composers' association BMI, was a smoke-screen for its desire to pay less for the music it used.

Mr. Petrillo may act with unattractive ruthlessness; but his industry opponents' ruthlessness is not less for being expressed in better English and concealed behind phony professions of noble motives. Behind those phony pretensions they are ruthless on behalf of corporate profits; whereas he is ruthless frankly on behalf of the welfare of 150,000 or 200,000 union musicians. In the present dispute he has presented a good case to the public badly; and his industry opponents have taken advantage of his ineptitude to make the case itself appear bad to the public. He has made unreasonable demands; and his industry opponents have taken advantage of this to hide the fact that they are not disposed to grant reasonable ones. Understand the men he is dealing with, who would, for example, like nothing better than to fill up broadcasting time with good amateur performance and save themselves the cost of professional musicians at union rates; then you will understand some of his actions that seem so shocking, like his barring of the Camp Interlochen Orchestra from the air unless a professional orchestra were paid to "stand by."

B. H. HAGGIN

Letters to the Editors

Dr. Barnard Is Right

Dear Sirs: Ellsworth Barnard's letter in your issue of July 3, which has already provoked so much comment, is probably the outstanding letter that has appeared in your pages in the year.

He put his finger on the primary defect in the whole situation—that is, the present-day "education" courses as being the basic cause of poor teaching. His reference to terminology as "unintelligible jargon" is, of course, strictly in accord with the facts. Perhaps it should be added that this senseless and silly jargon merits the same careful and brilliant indictment that Professor Fred Rodell of Yale Law School gave to the legal profession in his book "Woe Unto Ye Lawyers!"

Professor Edgar B. Wesley, former president of the National Council for the Social Studies, writing in your issue of August 28, objects to Dr. Barnard's plain speaking. In fact, he draws the comparison of two Greeks standing on a corner and talking in their native language. Professor Wesley says he himself might unthinkingly remark, "What dumb jargon! I don't understand it!"

The comparison, of course, is silly. The educationists are not like the two Greeks standing on the corner. They (the educationists) are not aliens to the English language. They speak it better than any other language. They are aware of the richness of its simplicity. They know how to use it, but they do not choose to use it. Bent on impressing each other with vague abstractions, they have invented a language of their own, a futile "unintelligible jargon," as Ellsworth Barnard aptly describes it.

As to "education" courses being the cause of poor teaching, the educationists and particularly the National Council for the Social Studies, whose viewpoint Professor Wesley reflects, will vigorously object, but the fact is Dr. Barnard has stated the simple truth.

Of course, there are exceptions. New York State is one of them. When John Lord O'Brien and Susan Brandeis came to the Regents of the University of the State of New York they found that the curriculum of state teachers' colleges was composed of two parts how to teach and one part what to teach. By hard work and determination they succeeded in reversing this monstrous absurdity. Now

state teachers' colleges in New York have a basic curriculum composed of two parts what to teach and one part how to teach. When I asked Mr. O'Brien how he got around the influence of Teachers College, Columbia, he replied simply: "That was easy. We just ignored them."

Thanks to John Lord O'Brien and Susan Brandeis, New York State has the best teachers-training program in America. But it still is not good enough. And Dr. Barnard has done an excellent service, despite the objection of Professor Wesley, in pointing to some of the cobwebs remaining.

It is not by accident that New York State schools accord the best treatment to the history of the United States. Likewise, incidentally, to almost every other subject.

Indeed, John Lord O'Brien and Susan Brandeis found Professor Wesley's "two Greeks" standing on the corner and taught them to speak plain, intelligible English! And for that they will never be forgiven.

HUGH RUSSELL FRASER, Chairman,
Committee on American History
Washington, September 3

Consider the Children

Dear Sirs: Is it patriotic to say a word in behalf of the million or more children who will become virtual orphans this year if the War Manpower Commission carries out its announced intention of drafting pre-Pearl Harbor fathers?

For orphans they will surely be, since most of the mothers involved, unable to subsist on the miserable military dependency allowances, will be forced to seek employment while they leave their children in the care of relatives or day nurseries, if any.

The Nation betrays an amazing lack of social consciousness when it states in the issue of August 28: "Surely no one would seriously maintain that dependency status or family relationship should take precedence over contribution to the war effort as a basis for draft deferment." This is sheer war hysteria, on a par with that oft-parroted contention that "fathers have something to fight for." So have pregnant women, but even the most callous individual would shrink from the prospect of conscripting them.

The Nation, with a strange tone of finality, interprets the impending draft of fathers as primarily a squeeze play designed to smoke fathers out of non-essential and into essential jobs. But the statements of Selective Service and WMC officials are utterly at variance with this interpretation.

Indeed, for the past year or more these gentlemen have waged a war of nerves against 6,000,000 American families with an almost daily needling in the news columns about the draft of fathers. No straightforward statement of policy embodying *The Nation's* interpretation has ever been forthcoming. On any number of occasions Selective Service officials have warned fathers that the transfer from a non-essential to an essential job would not stave off their conscription.

Is it political opportunism for a Congressman to view with concern the prospective mass breakup of hundreds of thousands of American families? And who is so omniscient a military expert as to say that we must have an armed force of 11,000,000 men, no matter how seriously we strain the social fabric thereby?

Public opinion against the draft of fathers is not based on any tender feelings toward the fathers themselves. They are not entitled to any more consideration than any other group. The opposition to their conscription is based rather on an overwhelming pity for the children left behind, the next generation which may have to fight World War III. Must we start so early to wreck the generation?

SUBSCRIBER
Ardley, Pa., September 2

[*The Nation* is in full agreement with two of Subscriber's criticisms. We agree that the confused and conflicting statements given out by the War Manpower Commission with respect to the drafting of pre-Pearl Harbor fathers are in large part responsible for the fact that fathers have not flocked into essential war jobs as they were expected to do. Moreover, we thoroughly agree that the "miserable military dependency allowances" should be substantially increased in view of the decision to draft fathers.]

But the essential issue at the moment is not how well or how badly the War Manpower Commission has carried out its duties; it is whether our man-power

Policy shall be formulated on the basis of each individual's greatest possible contribution to the war effort or on the basis of "an overwhelming pity for the children left behind." Everything possible should be done for the children, not only in the long run even the families directly affected will benefit most from a policy that maximizes our slender manpower resources in order to shorten the war.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

Still Waiting

Sirs: Last November Mr. James G. McDonald wrote you a letter which began: "I opened your issue which reached me last Friday with a curious interest to see whether you, unlike most other critics of the State Department's Vichy policy, had been frank enough to admit that the American and British offensive in Northwest Africa had proved that you had been mistaken and the department amply justified. But I found no such admission. . . ."

Since Mr. McDonald thought you would make a public confession of error, I have opened each issue of *The Nation* recent months with a curious interest to see whether he had been frank enough to admit in a letter to you that an increasingly clear revelation of what the State Department wanted to achieve in Europe by its dealings with Pétain, Laval, Peyrouton, Giraud, Franco, Otto Hapsburg, and by its snubbing of their democratic, anti-fascist opponents had proved that he, Mr. McDonald, had been mistaken and that your criticism of the department had been amply justified. But I have found no such admission.

I should add that this has not surprised me. For on a Saturday night in 1942, I was trying to get news on the radio, and a turn of the knob brought me the voice of Mr. McDonald introducing and interviewing—with very respectful "Your Highnesses"—Otto Hapsburg. The occasion was the celebration of Austria Day; and not only Otto being presented as the spokesman for Austria on this official occasion, but the day chosen for the occasion was the anniversary of the assassination of Dollfuss. Mr. McDonald's questions asked from Otto a description of Austria's importance in the war, its people's attitude to Hitler; and then Austria's people were linked with Dollfuss, of whom Otto said at one point: "While one may disagree with certain of his views concerning labor"—which His Highness's tactful way of re-

fering to Dollfuss's armed attack on the workers of Vienna in 1934 and his destruction of their political power—"all must admit his patriotism as an Austrian."

This interview seems to have been one of the opening guns in the campaign for Otto and his Austrian Legion; and Mr. McDonald's participation in it would indicate that he approves of what the State Department wants to achieve and of the methods by which it is attempting to achieve it.

EMERY CROSSWITH

New York, September 3

To Make the Angels Weep

Dear Sirs: Reinhold Niebuhr's article *England Teaches Its Soldiers*, in *The Nation* of August 21, is very welcome reading to those of us in the ranks who are increasingly appalled by the situation which he describes. There is not a sentence with which the average intelligent soldier would care to disagree, but as I reread and thought over Dr. Niebuhr's article, I wondered if he isn't being a little hard on the army when he blames upon it the cultural and educational impotence of its soldiers. "The American soldier has Hollywood for his leisure hours." While one may regret bitterly, as many of us have, that the army doesn't provide more extra-curricular training, if I may borrow a term from the academic world, one cannot blame the army entirely for the fact that Hollywood occupies the army's leisure time. Water will seek its own level, and if the taste of the soldier is for something richer and better than Hollywood, he'll find it.

I'm certainly not suggesting that Dr. Niebuhr doesn't understand that the stupidity—an unkind, but an accurate word—of the American soldier cannot be explained merely by the lack of an educational program in the army. The soldier is, of course, just as educated, just as cultured, as interested in democracy as his education and his background have fitted and encouraged him to be. I haven't the slightest doubt that Dr. Niebuhr knows this, but I don't think he made it quite clear—or that he restricted his remarks carefully enough to a commentary on the political ignorance of the soldier which might be largely the result of the army's lack of an educational program.

I wondered what the result would have been if Dr. Niebuhr could have made his tour in American camps under the same conditions which attended the tour in England. I seriously doubt that

he could say afterwards that "in a week of forums, not a silly question was asked." Provided by some miracle a group of heterogeneous soldiers, all interested in the issues of the war, could be assembled for a forum, I would lay odds that there would be plenty of damned silly questions.

Does the public realize, I wonder, how horribly true the condition described in Pfc. E. W.'s letter (which I was glad to see also in your issue of August 21)? If they think he is too gloomy, too pessimistic, I would invite the skeptics to view the magazine rack at the post exchange. (Dear Editor: I'm so glad you can't see how *The Nation* is wedged every week between *Red Hot Romances* on one side and *Western Stories* on the other.) I would invite the skeptic to visit the day room when the President of the United States is making an important speech. Yes, come on in, skeptics, there's plenty of room; all the boys are at the movie. And for the crowning blow, I would invite him to one of those semi-annual bull sessions when the talk turns for a few minutes from sex to world affairs. I don't think even Hollywood could promise anything as monstrous as the last one was. The line of reasoning went about like this: Let's hurry up and get this over with, doesn't matter much who wins . . . not much difference between the German and American governments. . . . We're really not a democracy, with gasoline and tires being rationed. (Oh, no, Mr. Skeptic, that isn't Mr. Harrison Spangler, that's a private in the army which is fighting for the very life of democracy itself.) In justice, it ought to be said that this bull session, which I swear I have summarized quite faithfully, was below par. Most soldiers certainly feel that there is considerable difference between the Nazis and ourselves, and that we'd better win the war, but beyond that I'm afraid the soldier's knowledge does not extend very far.


Facts like these are enough to make the angels weep—and ought to make every good American citizen wonder what kind of nation, what kind of civilization has produced such an army. The record suggests that we have failed in many respects, but the important lesson to be learned is that we had better start doing something to prevent a repetition of our folly. In bringing to the attention of the public the regrettable state of the American army *The Nation* is doing a real service to democracy.

PVT. G. C.

"Somewhere in Kansas," August 30

Cross-Word Puzzle No. 30

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

- 1 Does the novice indicate his dining room?
- 6 Head or pie, it depends on the accent
- 10 A cruel way of making money
- 11 Familiar Eastern shrub
- 12 Fish (with tea and bread included)
- 13 Banking expert whose work is often on a lofty plane
- 16 Is this instrument used for calling the cat in India? (hyphen, 3 and 3)
- 17 I pass on (anag.)
- 18 "There is no other royal ---- which leads to geometry" (Euclid to Ptolemy I)
- 20 Should be taken before meals
- 22 The order the soldier likes best?
- 23 Harmless reptiles
- 24 Teeth, but not for eating with
- 25 Potential juggled hare?
- 27 Salutes perhaps, but they can hardly have a salutary effect on the enemy
- 29 Often a dry drink
- 34 Wotton wrote of its meaner beauties
- 35 Palindromic commander
- 36 A girl in merry surroundings
- 37 "As proper men as ever ---- upon neat's leather" (Julius Caesar)
- 38 Tin cruet containing the medicine you want

DOWN

- 2 This is more palatable with ice in it
- 3 I prefer my sporting footwear without one (hyphen, 3 and 3)
- 4 Plays a part, or parts of plays
- 5 Cheese that's made backward
- 6 Usually has a pressing engagement at meal times

- 7 It is literally tickled to death
- 8 You have a bone to pick
- 9 This plant is enough to make a cat smile
- 14 Oysters raised in artificial beds
- 15 One at war with society
- 16 Tumbles
- 18 There's no time like the -----
- 19 Not a long drink but it appears to add up
- 21 The eternal "I"
- 25 Was Toledo ever pillaged? It is here!
- 26 Homer wrote of pining with this amidst a sea of waves
- 28 You don't demand age in this drink, but you get it
- 30 Has a bed but never goes to bed
- 31 University lock
- 32 Where teas come from
- 33 The name of the parlor maid who broke every day?

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 29

ACROSS: 1 WIGWAM; 5 SUEDES; 9 RAILMAN; 11 AWNING; 12 LINNET; 13 OIL-EST; 14 TREE; 17 ARRL; 19 HORSEWHIP; 22 GLEDE; 23 AONIA; 25 FLUENT; 26 NUDIST; 27 DEMON; 29 BEARD; 31 LANT-HORN; 34 RAKE; 36 SAGO; 37 NEW LEAF; 39 DAMSON; 40 LLAMAS; 41 REP-TILE; 42 EVOKES; 43 YARNED.

DOWN: 1 WEALTH; 2 GINGER; 3 ARNO; 4 MAGIC WAND; 5 SALS; 6 UNIT; 7 DANUBE; 8 SETTLE; 10 LAID IN; 15 HOP-FLEA; 16 ESQUIRE; 17 ALHINOS; 18 EDITING; 20 HOTEL; 21 PINON; 24 AUNT RALLY; 28 MALLET; 29 BRIDLE; 30 AKIMBO; 32 RAGMAN; 33 SOURED; 35 BENES; 37 NORE; 38 FLEA.

CONTRIBUTORS

HAROLD J. LASKI, professor of political science at the University of London, is a leading member of the British Labor Party. Among his many books are "The Rise of European Liberalism," "The American Presidency," and "Liberty in the Modern State."

DONALD W. MITCHELL, professor of political science at Sam Houston State Teachers College, Texas, is now at work on a history of the United States navy since 1883.

FRANCIS WESTBROOK, JR., is editor of *Textile Age*, an industrial monthly.

JOHN W. GERBER is manager of the short-wave listening station of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

JACQUES BARZUN is associate professor of history at Columbia University and author of "Culture in the Democracy" and "Race: The Modern Myth."

PAUL ROSENFELD is a well-known critic of modern painting. He is the author of "By Way of Art."

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

A Choice of Kipling's Verse. With an Essay on Rudyard Kipling. Edited by T. S. Eliot. Scribner's. \$2.50.

Harriet Tubman. By Earl Conrad. Associated Publishers. \$3.25.

Itinerary for a Phagocyte. By William Eldridge. Harbinger. \$1.50.

Skyways to Berlin. By Redding and Leysbon. Bobbs-Merrill. \$2.75.

Out of My Mind. By Katharine Brush. Doubleday, Doran. \$1.50.

Going Fishing. By Negley Farson. Harcourt, Brace. \$3.

Back Door to Berlin: The Full Story of the American Coup in North Africa. By W. Gallagher. Doubleday, Doran. \$2.75.

Japan Fights for Asia. By John Goette. Harcourt, Brace. \$2.50.

Scouting and Patrolling: The Soldier, the Enemy, the Ground. Infantry Journal. Penguin Books. 25 cents.

Studies on War: A Military Affairs Reader. Infantry Journal, Penguin Books. 25 cents.

Log Book. By Frank Laskier. Scribner's. \$1.25.

The Book of Canadian Poetry: A Critical and Historical Anthology. Edited with an Introduction by A. J. M. Smith. Chicago. \$3.50.

The American Land: Its History and Its Uses. By William R. Van Dersal. Oxford. \$3.75.

Sixteen Famous British Plays. Compiled by Bennett A. Cerf and Van H. Cartmell. Modern Library. \$1.45.

Clausewitz on War. Translated by O. Matthijs Jolles. Modern Library. \$1.45.

TION
S

or of pe
of Lon
ne Briti
ny book
eralism
and "Lib

professo
ston Stan
w at wo
ates nav

, is edito
monthly

ger of the
f the Co

ciate pro
University
e Democ
n Myth

ell-known
He is the

SHED

th an Essa
T. S. Eliot

Associat

y William

nd Leysbo

rine Brush

n. Harcour

Story of the

ica. By W

\$2.75.

Goette. Har

Soldier, the

try Journal

Airs Reader

ks. 25 cents

Scribner's

A Critic

ited with m

ith. Chicago

ory and In

rsal. Oxford

Compiled by

H. Cartmel

ed by O. I

ary. \$1.45.

CEN